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STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
CONTINUITY IN A 9/11 WORLD: SURVIVING
AN "ENEMY ATTACK"
Eric R. Daleo*
INTRODUCTION
Six minutes after the California State Assembly approved a mea-
sure to solve the State's energy crisis, an 80,000 pound, eighteen-wheel
tractor-trailer intentionally crashed into the south entrance of the
state capitol at a speed of fifty miles per hour.1 The impact caused a
massive explosion with flames on the ground floor reaching as high as
third-floor windows, charring inside hallways and destroying a legisla-
tive committee hearing room.2 The truck's driver was killed instantly
in "a ball of fire."' 3 Inside the legislative chamber, police instructed
Assembly members to evacuate, and the Assembly's loudspeaker sys-
tem warned, "This is not a drill."'4 Hundreds of legislators and staff
fled the state capitol in the moments following the explosion. 5
The January 16, 2001 attack on the California State House was not
perpetrated by a foreign terrorist group, but rather by Mike Bowers-
a parolee despondent over the breakup of his marriage.6 His cargo
was not an explosive device, but rather cans of sweetened condensed
* J.D., Rutgers University School of Law-Camden; M.A. in History and Public Policy, The
George Washington University; B.A., The George Washington University. Rutgers Distin-
guished Professor Robert F. Williams provided extraordinarily helpful feedback and was singu-
larly instrumental in my decision to publish this piece. Professor Williams has devoted much of
his livelihood to imprinting on his students the importance and relevance of state constitutions in
our federal system. Although I hope this Article is a positive reflection on his teaching and the
significant impact he has had on my legal studies, all errors are my own.
1. Julie Tamaki & Carl Ingram, Truck Driver in Capitol Crash Had History of Mental Illness,
Violence, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WLNR 10547559; Mareva Brown et
al., Truck Rams Capitol: Driver Killed in Fiery Attack, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al,
available at 2001 WLNR 11233322.
2. Brown et al., supra note 1; Lynda Gledhill et al., Truck Rams Capitol, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 17,
2001, at Al, available at 2001 WLNR 5737123.
3. Tamaki & Ingram, supra note 1.
4. Brown et al., supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See id.
6. See Sam Stanton, Tapes Tell Story of Terror, Duty in Capitol Crash, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan.
20, 2001, at Al. available at 2001 WLNR 11229238.
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milk slated for delivery in South Dakota.7 Investigators believe that
Mr. Bowers was not targeting legislators,8 and no injuries were re-
ported in the capitol.9 "We were very lucky," California Highway Pa-
trol Commissioner D.O. "Spike" Helmick said after the attack. 10 "It
could have been a much worse tragedy."'"
The scenario would have been much worse if Mr. Bowers had in-
tended to target the California Legislature-if the cargo within his
80,000 pound truck was explosive and not condensed dairy. It is not a
strain to imagine his truck colliding with the inner walls of the busy
Assembly chamber instead of an empty hearing room. In such a sce-
nario, Mr. Bowers could have killed many lawmakers, 12 and those cas-
ualties could have resulted in the invocation of a little-known and
never-before-studied provision of the California State Constitution.
The constitutions of thirty-five American states, including Califor-
nia,13 textually authorize the suspension of constitutional norms and
procedural protections following an "enemy attack," or in some cases,
"disaster. ' 14 These so-called "continuity of government" provisions
have little impact on the day-to-day operations of state government.
But, in the event of "enemy attack," the provisions potentially extend
sweeping powers to surviving legislators to take whatever steps neces-
sary to provide for the continuous operation of state and local
governments.
Existing academic scholarship has focused on the executive branch
and the governor's emergency powers to respond to disaster, 15 but
states also require operational legislatures in times of crisis.16 Follow-
ing a disaster, legislatures play a critical role in repopulating top gov-
ernment posts (including the governorship), budgeting, lawmaking,
and "checking" the executive branch in the delicate system of checks
7. Mareva Brown, M.S. Enkoji & Sam Stanton, Driver Suffered Delusions: Prison, Mental
Facilities Marked His Past, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 18, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WLNR
11217186.
8. Stanton, supra note 6 ("[T]here was no indication that Bowers was working with anyone
else or that he was targeting anyone inside.").
9. Gledhill et al., supra note 2.
10. Stanton, supra note 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. See, e.g., Michael Gardner, South Bay Lawmakers Shaken by Fiery Crash, DAILY BREEZE
(Torrance, Cal.), Jan. 18, 2001, at A8 ("'If that truck had been filled with explosives I wouldn't
be talking to you."' (quoting State Senator Debra Bowen)); Gledhill et al., supra note 2
("'Thank God there was nothing (explosive) in the truck or we would be toast."' (quoting
eyewitness)).
13. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
14. See infra notes 109-149 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237 (2006).
16. See infra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
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and balances. As the representative branch of state government, a
functioning legislature serves as an enduring and important symbol of
democracy during times when political stability is most threatened.' 7
To plan for legislative continuity, legislatures in many states have
relied on continuity of government provisions to enact statutes pro-
spectively waiving constitutional and statutory requirements and
standing procedural rules during periods of emergency. 18 For exam-
ple, constitutional quorum requirements as well as single-subject and
other process rules-originally "designed to fix accountability and to
enhance participation and deliberation" 19-will be statutorily nullified
in the event of an "attack" in eleven states.20 Separately, eleven states
have used continuity of government provisions to provide for "shadow
legislatures"-authorizing a cadre of unelected and unknown mem-
bers of the public to "step into the shoes" of individual legislators with
full legislative powers, immunities, and voting rights-should a cata-
strophic attack render the elected state legislature unable to meet or
proceed with business.21
While this Article argues that continuity of government provisions
in state constitutions have modern relevance in an era of new global
threats, these provisions are also significant because they provide a
window into a different America. Their placement in state constitu-
tions contributes to our understanding of the times in which they were
adopted 22-a period in the national history where "nuclear war and
17. On the evening of September 11, 2001, Americans were simultaneously touched and reas-
sured when Republican and Democratic members of the U.S. Congress, after observing a mo-
ment of silence, stood shoulder-to-shoulder on the steps of the Capitol to sing a "spontaneous
chorus" of God Bless America. See John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Outraged Lawmakers Vow
to Keep Hill Going: Briefly Evacuated, Congress Returns to Show Resolve, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 2001, at A21. Radio stations across the nation "frequently [relplayed" the lawmakers' "im-
promptu version" of the song in the week following the World Trade Center tragedy. Press
Release, Media Base 24/7, Mediabase 24/7 Tracks the Trends in Music Airplay-Lee Green-
wood's "God Bless The U.S.A." is the Most Played Song (Sept. 20, 2001) (on file with author).
18. State constitutional continuity of government provisions are not self-executing. See infra
notes 176-262 and accompanying text.
19. Michael E. Libonati, The Legislative Branch, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 37, 56 (G. Alan
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). Unlike the Federal Constitution, most state constitutions
textually contain specific and detailed restrictions on lawmaking procedures. See id.
20. See infra notes 182-198 and accompanying text (discussing quorum suspension statutes).
21. See infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text (discussing interim legislative succession
acts).
22. State constitutions have been referred to as a "cinematoscope of the times." JAMES
QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTrIUTIONS § 2.77 (Da Capo Press 1972)
(1915), quoted in ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1
n.2 (4th ed. 2006). Under the "historical-movement model," state constitutions reflect "not dis-
tinctive state political cultures but rather the political forces prevailing nationally at the time
they were adopted." G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective, in
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survival [was] embraced by an entire nation as the subject of urgent
debate. '2 3 Thus, their origins are inextricably tied to what has been
described as "the story of American society under nuclear attack. '24
The federal government, expressing a belief that state governments
are critical in the "direction of supporting operations in an emer-
gency,"' 25 first proposed a model continuity of government constitu-
tional measure to the states in 1957.26 In a period of just seven years
(1959-1966), marked by the height of the Cold War and Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis and the beginning of American involvement in Vietnam,
thirty-five states amended their constitutions to add the federally pro-
posed model provision (or variations thereof).27 Illustrative of the
spectacular speed at which these provisions were added to state con-
stitutions, fourteen states ratified continuity of government amend-
ments on a single day: November 8, 1960.28 Virtually every
amendment passed with little, if any, organized opposition.29
Though Americans may no longer fear nuclear holocaust, con-
tinuity of government planning remains a critical component of pas-
sive defense and emergency management planning. 30 The attacks of
September 11, 2001, the perceived threat of foreign and domestic ter-
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL
PATTERNS 3, 4 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). Continuity of government provisions are instructive
examples of state constitutions serving as "'mine[s] of instruction for the natural history of dem-
ocratic communities."' See 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 413, 434 (New
York, Macmillan rev. 2d ed. 1891), quoted in WILLIAMS, supra, at 1.
23. KENNETH D. ROSE, ONE NATION UNDERGROUND: THE FALLOUT SHELTER IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 1 (2001).
24. Guy OAKES, THE IMAGINARY WAR: CIVIL DEFENSE AND AMERICAN COLD WAR CUL-
TURE 8 (1994); see also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing the "bunker cul-
ture" of American society that prompted the development and passage of state continuity of
government provisions).
25. NAT'L SEC. RES. BD., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES CIVIL DE-
FENSE 5 (1950) ("The States are established with inherent powers and accompanying responsibil-
ity, and have clear qualifications to coordinate civil-defense operations within their boundaries,
and in emergency to direct them."); see also infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (identifying the model federal provision).
27. See infra notes 109-149 and accompanying text (compiling continuity of government pro-
visions adopted and respective years of adoption).
28. Those states include Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.
See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION: PROGRAM FOR 1961, at 33,
35 (1960); see also infra notes 109-149 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: PLANNING
FOR GOVERNMENT CONTINUITY 1-2 (2003) ("To mitigate the consequences of potential catastro-
phes ranging from terrorist attacks to natural disasters, [state] government must ... develop and
adopt Continuity of Government (COG) plans."); William H. Kincade, Repeating History: The
Civil Defense Debate Renewed, 2 INT'L SECURITY 99, 101 (1978) (noting that a passive defense
program will normally include "measures for assuring the continuity of government").
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rorism against state institutions of democracy (including state legisla-
tures), and recent natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina,31
confirm the continuing relevance of (and need for) state continuity of
government provisions. Following a disaster, it is important that there
are public officials with legal authority to act. These provisions em-
phasize the need for continuity of state government and ensure the
capacity of state legislators to provide leadership, direction, and au-
thority necessary for government survival in the event of a cata-
strophic event.32
This Article advocates that today's state legislatures consider issues
related to the continuity of the legislative branch of state government
and update existing statutory enactments and constitutional provisions
that deal with continuity in light of existing threats. Part II of this
Article examines the role a state legislature assumes during a period
of widespread emergency.33 It argues that, given the plenary powers
of the legislature and the symbolic qualities of the body, a functioning
legislature is especially needed in periods of crisis. Part III considers
the modern impediments and circumstances that might prevent a leg-
islature from meeting or conducting business during an emergency-
the potential circumstances that may one day trigger the need for acti-
vation of a state's continuity of government plan.34 Part IV analyzes
the origins, history of adoption, and modern scope of constitutional
provisions authorizing legislatures to suspend provisions of state con-
stitutions in the interest of the continuous operation of government.35
Part V examines existing statutory enactments that have sought to ad-
dress succession and procedural quandaries in a legislature where
mass incapacitation has occurred.36 The final Part of this Article ad-
vocates for the modernization of language in existing constitutional
and statutory schemes and the adoption of continuity of government
constitutional provisions in the fifteen states lacking any continuity
planning.37
31. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (cataloging potential threats and impedi-
ments that may prevent a state legislature from conducting business).
32. For a discussion on the role of state legislatures in times of crisis, see infra notes 38-61 and
accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 74-175 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 176-262 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 263-297 and accompanying text.
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II. THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATURES IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY
Just as an attack against the U.S. Congress could "result in a loss of
individuals critical to governance, destroy important symbols of gov-
ernment, and undermine the national sense of safety and security, 38
an attack against a state legislature could destabilize a regional politi-
cal environment. Following a widespread disaster or enemy attack,
the ability of state legislatures to continue to meet and transact busi-
ness is critical. The Madisonian notion that states have a diminished
role in times of war and danger 39 is no longer an accurate portrayal of
modern circumstance. According to the federal government's emer-
gency management plan, state governments are today the "lead in re-
sponse and recovery" because state and local governments are
"closest to those impacted by incidents. ' 40
It can be argued that as a result of a trend in American state consti-
tutions to grant additional powers to governors and state executive
branches, 4' and given the broad scope of gubernatorial emergency
powers,42 the need for state legislatures in times of crisis has corre-
spondingly decreased. 43 This view is deficient, however, as legisla-
38. R. Eric Petersen & Jeffrey W. Seifert, Congressional Continuity of Operations (COOP):
An Overview of Concepts and Challenges, in CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 1, 2-3 (Derrick J.
Dreiole ed., 2007) (discussing result of possible attack against U.S. Congress).
39. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 227 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) ("The
operations of the Federal Government will be most extensive and important in times of war and
danger; those of the State Governments in times of peace and security.").
40. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK 5 (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdflemergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf; see also
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEM 12 (draft ed. 2007), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-nims.
pdf ("In the vast majority of incidents, local resources.., will provide the first line of emergency
response and incident management."). According to Eric D. Hargan, Acting Deputy Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, state and local government units will
play a critical role in the event of a national pandemic. See Eric D. Hargan, Setting Expectations
for the Federal Role in Public Health Emergencies, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 8, 10 (2008) ("[Llocal
preparedness must be the foundation of pandemic readiness, because in case of a national pan-
demic, there is going to be no unaffected area.., to take care of patients in affected areas; thus,
... every local community has to make do with its own resources.").
41. For example, New Jersey's chief executive has, over time, garnered substantial power. See
Eric R. Daleo, Note, The Scope and Linits of the New Jersey Governor's Authority to Remove
the Attorney General and Others "For Cause," 39 RUTGERS L.J. 393, 403-05 (2008) (docu-
menting rise of New Jersey governor's powers from 1776 New Jersey Constitution to present
day).
42. See infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the governor's emergency powers).
43. Some have argued that the power and influence of the legislative branch of state govern-
ment-even in periods of non-emergency-has declined greatly. Cf WILDER CRANE, JR. &
MEREDITH W. WAT-rS, JR., STATE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS 5 (1968) ("[T]he status of the legisla-
ture compared to other agencies of governmental power has declined since the American Re-
public was established. Yet, . . . this decline is relative, not absolute. Most state legislatures may
deal with matters of great importance and spend enormous sums of money-far more so than in
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tures still have a defined role in budgeting, lawmaking, and
"checking" the executive branch in the system of checks and balances.
These responsibilities become particularly important in times of crisis.
Although state governors are clothed with considerable emergency
authority, 44 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
has noted that legislatures are still needed to serve lawmaking func-
tions following a disaster.45 The legislature may be needed to author-
ize funding of efforts to "respond to, recover from, or mitigate
damage from disasters. '46 The legislature may be called on to enact
or reform a wide range of state laws, including laws governing build-
ing and fire codes, infrastructure protection, and school safety, among
others. 47 The legislature may also be in the best position to assure the
preservation and protection of "vital government documents," includ-
ing legislative and judicial records.48 In at least one state, legislative
action is required to call out the state militia.49 And nineteen states
Colonial times or even in the nineteenth century; but other agencies of government, such as the
executive and the judiciary, have grown even more in importance, so that the power of the
legislature is relatively decreased.").
44. For example, the Louisiana Governor's "strong powers ... during times of crisis" include
the power to "appropriate state funds," "call state armed forces," "convene a special legislative
session," and "'issue executive orders' ... which shall have the 'force and effect of law."' Rossi,
supra note 15, at 243-44 (citations omitted).
45. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, GUIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATE AND
LOCAL CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 2-2 (1987). One FEMA publication notes:
Laws provide the legal authority, requirements, and proscriptions under which public
officials carry out their responsibilities and democratic societies function. The legisla-
tive system is important in the preparedness phase to legislate emergency powers and
authorities and must be sustained through recovery and reconstitution to provide au-
thority for implementation of necessary government actions not otherwise authorized
by the law.
Id.
46. Mass. State Senator Richard T. Moore, Managing Disasters: Suggestions for Legislative
Staff, Remarks Before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications & Lead-
ership Professional Development Seminar (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.senatormoore.
com/news/archive2005/10/102705-1.htm. Alabama's governor, for example, is not given appro-
priations authority in the event of an emergency. See Rossi, supra note 15, at 245.
47. See Moore, supra note 46.
48. See id.
49. See TENN. CONST. art. III, § 5 ("[The governor] shall be commander-in-chief of the Army
and Navy of this State, and of the Militia, except when they shall be called into the service of the
United States: But the Militia shall not be called into service except in case of rebellion or
invasion, and then only when the General Assembly shall declare, by law, that the public safety
requires it." (emphasis added)). But see F. David Trickey, Comment, Constitutional and Statu-
tory Bases of Governors' Emergency Powers, 64 MICH. L. REV. 290, 292 & n.12 (1965) (compiling
fourteen state constitutional provisions "explicitly authorizing the governor to call out the na-
tional guard").
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prohibit the governor from suspending the operation of laws, reserv-
ing that power instead to the exclusive province of the legislature. 50
The legislature may also play a role in the selection and repopula-
tion of key government posts, including the office of governor. 5' In
some states, if the governor is incapacitated (but still living), the re-
sponsibility to assess the capacity of the governor's continued service
falls on legislative leaders or the legislature as a body. 52 If an attack
renders a governor missing, a legislature will likely be needed to de-
cide the process for filling the resulting vacuum of power. Legisla-
tures are also "essential" to the maintenance of a system of checks
and balances during, and immediately following, periods of disaster.5 3
50. See Trickey, supra note 49, at 293-94.
51. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 45, at 2-2 ("The order of succession for
State and local chief executives under emergency conditions must be established pursuant to
law.").
52. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 18, para. e. For example, the Connecticut Constitution
provides:
In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor and in an emer-
gency,... the lieutenant-governor shall transmit to the council on gubernatorial inca-
pacity a written declaration . . . and thereupon shall exercise the powers ... [of] the
office of governor as acting governor. The council shall convene.., to determine if the
governor is unable to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office. If the
council . . . determines by two-thirds vote that the governor is unable to exercise the
powers . . . , it shall transmit a written declaration to that effect to the president pro
tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives . . . . Upon
receipt by the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of repre-
sentatives of such a written declaration from the council, the general assembly shall, in
accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that
purpose if not in session. If the general assembly ... determines by two-thirds vote of
each house that the governor is unable to exercise the powers and discharge the duties
of his office, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to exercise the powers ....
Id. (emphasis added).
In New Jersey, the state's supreme court ultimately decides whether the governor is unable to
discharge the duties of his office, but the legislature is tasked with initiating the action. See N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 8 ("Such vacancy shall be determined by the Supreme Court upon
presentment to it of a concurrent resolution declaring the ground of the vacancy, adopted by a vote
of two-thirds of all the members of each house of the Legislature, and upon notice, hearing before
the Court and proof of the existence of the vacancy." (emphasis added)). For a discussion on
gubernatorial incapacity, see generally Brian J. Gaines, Gubernatorial Incapacity: A Review of
Succession Provisions, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV'T, Fall 2004, at 26, available at http://csg-web.csg.
org/pubsfDocuments/spec-fa04Gubernatoriallncapacity.pdf.
53. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 45, at 2-2 (noting that following a
disaster, legislatures are "essential to maintaining the system of checks and balances with other
branches of government"); MICHAEL FREEMAN, FREEDOM OR SECURITY: THE CONSEQUENCES
FOR DEMOCRACIES USING EMERGENCY POWERS TO FIGHT TERROR 10 (2003) ("The separation
of powers improves the capability of one branch of government to check other branches if emer-
gency powers are abused. In constitutional systems,... the different branches of government
have the capability to constrain other branches."); Rossi, supra note 15, at 240 ("The exercise of
executive emergency powers is most effectively policed by the state legislature and not courts.").
No one individual should be vested with unlimited and un-policed authority. Without a legisla-
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In this regard, "[s]urveillance or oversight of the administration has
long been regarded as an essential function of representative
assemblies. 54
At the same time, depending on the magnitude of the disaster, a
threat of anarchy may lead to the imposition of martial law through-
out a state.55 Without the clear maintenance of state leadership, and
in the absence of authority universally regarded as legitimate, conflict
and instability may arise.56 In the wake of an enemy attack or disas-
ter, it may be unclear "who the chief officers of government legiti-
mately are."' 57 On the morrow of an attack or disaster, legislators
would be needed "to reassure, to inspire, to lead and give direction to
the stricken people. '58 Thus, following a disaster, individual legisla-
tors would play an important symbolic role in reassuring constituents
and the public of the government's capacity to respond. 59 It has been
written that "[g]enuinely effective and responsive legislatures enhance
the stability of democratic regimes.' '60 Perhaps for this reason, the
tive check, it may be possible for a governor or her associates to employ emergency powers "to
permanently undermine individual liberties or seize greater powers within the state." FREEMAN,
supra, at 3.
54. William J. Keefe, The Functions and Powers of the State Legislatures, in STATE LEGISLA-
TURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 37, 44 (Alexander Heard ed., 1966).
55. See Homer D. Crotty, The Administration of Justice and the A-Bomb: What Follows Dis-
aster?, 37 A.B.A. J. 893, 895 (1951) ("Immediately following an atomic bombing, where the civil
authorities are unable to act, comes martial law.").
56. See James W. Beebe, Local Government and the H-Bomb: A New California Statute
Prepares for Attack, 44 A.B.A. J. 149, 150, 152 (1958) ("Civilian government is such an impor-
tant part of American life that its existence should not be open to doubt.... It is important that
the enemy not be able to place men in the vital positions of standby officers."); see also COMP-
TROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. LCD-78-409, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONTINUITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN A CRITICAL
NATIONAL EMERGENCY-A NEGLECTED NECESSITY 8 (1978) ("If a central authority does not
exist or is essentially ineffective, the effects of the disaster and the recovery time will be much
greater. The chances of anarchy and civil disturbance in an environment without a strong central
authority also are greater.").
57. Jack Hirshleifer, Some Thoughts on the Social Structure After a Bombing Disaster, 8
WORLD POL. 206, 213 (1956).
58. Beebe, supra note 56, at 150 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See Moore, supra note 46. According to Massachusetts State Senator Richard T. Moore,
"When disaster strikes, legislators and legislative staff will be expected to play key roles, yet not
get in the way of those executive agencies at the state and local levels charged with the primary
responsibility of preparing for, responding to, recovering from and mitigating against disasters."
Id.
60. William Mishler & Anne Hildreth, Legislatures and Political Stability: An Exploratory
Analysis, 46 J. POL. 25, 25 (1984). A functioning and independent legislature is a symbol of
developed democracy. The conventional wisdom credits legislatures "with reducing levels of
political conflict, rendering conflict more manageable, and mitigating the effects of conflict on
government and regime." Id. at 26. But see id. at 27 (noting that political scientists have com-
piled "ample evidence that political systems can survive quite nicely in the absence of legisla-
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federal government has historically lobbied states to build their capa-
bility to continue government operations, including legislative opera-
tions, following an attack. 61
III. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MIGHT PREVENT A LEGISLATURE
FROM MEETING
The twenty-first century American legislature faces a variety of
threats that may interfere with its ability to meet and conduct busi-
ness, e.g., domestic or foreign terrorism, enemy attack, epidemiologi-
cal crisis, or man-made or natural disaster. When compared to the
U.S. Capitol Building or other federal government structures, e.g.,
Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, or centers of in-
ternational trade, e.g., the World Trade Center, the meeting houses of
state legislatures seem like less likely targets of domestic and foreign
terrorism. Our first intuitions, however, may be wrong. The National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has observed that security
of state buildings and legislators is, in many states, a subject "of in-
creasing concern. '62 A 2001 publication by the RAND Corporation 63
conceded that "capital buildings housing state legislatures and their
tures and that political stability on occasion may even be enhanced by their abolition" (citations
omitted)).
61. See OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT: SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION iii (1959). As the Office of
Civil and Defense Mobilization noted in 1959,
The development of the capability by State and local governments to continue func-
tioning in times of emergency will assure, to the greatest degree possible, that the invo-
cation of martial law will not be necessary in the event of an attack.
Military government is the antithesis of civil government. If the States, counties, and
cities carry out a continuity of government program, they will make a substantial con-
tribution toward guaranteeing that recovery of the Nation will be accomplished under
the direction of civil authority. This will facilitate the maintenance of the Nation in
accordance with our traditional concepts of constitutional government.
Id.
62. Kae M. Warnock, Is the State House Safe?, LEGISBRIEF (Nat'l Conference of State Legisla-
tures, Denver, Col.), Feb. 2002, at 1. Two recent incidents, in particular, have renewed concerns
for state house security. First, on January 16, 2001, a loaded semi-tractor trailer crashed into the
side of the California Capitol Building. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. Second, on
July 16, 2007, Colorado state troopers shot and killed an armed man who tried to enter the
governor's office within the capitol building. Mike McPhee, Armed Man Killed at Capitol in
Denver: Governor in His Office as Troopers Shoot Intruder, Rattling Several Tour Groups, CON-
TRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), July 17, 2007, at A15, available at 2007 WLNR
13782187 ("'[The gunman] said he was the emperor and he was here to take over state govern-
ment,' said Evan Dreyer, [a spokesman to the governor]."). The shooting "exposed vulnerabili-
ties that left statehouse employees rattled." Editorial, Increased Capitol Security Sensible,
DENVER POST, Sept. 6, 2007, at 6B, available at 2007 WLNR 17401138. Luckily, the Colorado
Legislature was not in session at the time. See Colleen Slevin, Metal Detectors Removed from
Capital in 2002, AP, July 17, 2007, available at http://cbsdenver.comllocallstate.capi-
tol.shooting.2.560284.html.
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offices ... could be targets" of terrorist activity. 64 A briefing by the
NCSL speculated that legislative meeting places may be "a more at-
tractive target" because domed capitol buildings tend to "resemble[ ]
the U.S. Capitol. '65 In addition, state houses may also be more attrac-
tive targets than federal buildings because of lax security. For exam-
ple, the majority of state capitols do not use metal detectors, 66 state
house access in many states is virtually unrestricted, 67 and at least six
states do not even have visible security at state house entrances. 68
States have resisted adding additional security measures, in part be-
cause of a desire to maintain the perception that legislative and other
state house activities are open to the public, 69 and perhaps out of a
belief that the chance of attack against state government is remote.
State legislators, given their opportunity and responsibility to vote
on sometimes controversial measures, are potential targets of domes-
tic terrorism. In Colorado, following a 2007 state house shooting,70
"legislative staff members told stories of feeling threatened, some-
times being threatened, by members of the public who were angry at
lawmakers over policy or proposed legislation. '71
Finally, as noted earlier, in addition to domestic and foreign threats,
the ability of a legislature to assemble may be significantly hampered
by the spread of pandemic disease 72 or the occurrence of a natural
63. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit think-tank which performs research and analysis.
See RAND Corp., About the RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/about (last visited Apr.
28, 2009).
64. ERIC V. LARSON & JOHN E. PETERS, RAND CORP., PREPARING THE U.S. ARMY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 101 (2001), available at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR1251/MR1251.Chap5.pdf (emphasis added).
65. Warnock, supra note 62, at 1.
66. See Jennifer Brown & Mark P. Couch, Ritter Orders Security Audit Following Capitol
Shooting, DENVER POST, July 19, 2007, at 1B, available at 2007 WLNR 13787716.
67. See id. (noting that only "a few states ... have strict procedures on access"); Suzanne
Hoholik, Security at Official Buildings Varies, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 19, 2007, at 1B, availa-
ble at 2007 WLNR 13778105 (noting that at Ohio's Statehouse "[p]eople can walk in and out,
into lawmakers' offices or to legislative sessions without telling anyone who they are"); War-
nock, supra note 62, at 1 (compiling a list of states where public access is restricted).
68. Hoholik, supra note 67. Those states include Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, North Caro-
lina, and West Virginia. Id.
69. See, e.g., Stateline: Capital Security, STATE LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2007, at 11 ("'It seems
that ever since 9-11, we have changed the way we live,.., at least in terms of access to our public
places. And that's unfortunate, because when you change the American way of life, you let the
wrongdoers win."' (quoting Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita)).
70. See supra note 62 (discussing the July 16, 2007 shooting in the Colorado State House).
71. Editorial, supra note 62 (emphasis omitted).
72. Ohio's executive branch has considered the impact of an influenza pandemic impacting
the continuity of state government. See generally Gov. Taft Leads State Agencies in Pandemic
Exercise, U.S. STATE NEWS, Nov. 30, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20813342. The governor of
Ohio observed, "If a pandemic would occur, there is a likelihood that many state workers may
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disaster. 73 Ultimately, such an event-even though not necessarily an
intentional act of a foreign or domestic "enemy"-may interfere with
legislative operations or physically prevent a legislature from meeting.
IV. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Recognition of the Importance of Continuity in the States
The 1950s and 1960s marked a period of obsession on the part of
the federal government and the nation's citizenry with the possibility
of thermonuclear war. Illustrative of the paranoia of the period, a
1950 "plan for organizing the civil defense of the United States" noted
that "[b]ecause of developments in this air-atomic age, the United
States can no longer be free from the danger of a sudden devastating
attack against the homeland. '74 In 1955, the federal government con-
ducted the first test of its "ability to cope with a hydrogen-bomb at-
tack"-the test was highlighted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's
evacuation to a secret bunker somewhere outside Washington, D.C. 75
The Library of Congress considered moving the nation's most impor-
tant documents to "other areas," presumably outside the District of
Columbia, to shield them from destruction in the event of an enemy
be sick or caring for sick loved ones during an outbreak. We must plan how state government
will operate under challenging circumstances." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73. In 1989, for example, an earthquake in San Francisco "threatened continuity of govern-
ment." NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, supra note 30, at 1-2. The earth-
quake caused the destruction of twelve city departments, prevented personnel from accessing
office space, and led to the postponement of municipal court proceedings. Id. As the San Fran-
cisco example illustrates, an earthquake may impede the movement of individual legislators,
foreclosing the opportunity to reach quorum levels and conduct legislative business following a
disaster.
74. NAT'L SEC. RES. BD., supra note 25, at III, 1. Commentators expressed fears of the at-
tendant dangers of new missile technology. See, e.g., H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., We Must Have
Courage: Law, National Security and Survival, 44 A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1958) ("There have been
developed weapons and systems for the delivery of these weapons which in a matter of hours,
ultimately even in minutes, can destroy nations and civilizations .... [A] single B-52 today can
deliver, on one mission, the explosive equivalent of all bombs dropped in World War II.").
75. Anthony Leviero, "H-Bombs" Test U.S. Civil Defense; Government Is Moved to Hide-
Outs; City Raid Alert Termed a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1955, at 1. The test involved the
dispersal of the "upper echelons of the Executive branch" into "about thirty hide-outs, with
President Eisenhower directing national affairs from a secret headquarters." Id. The test
marked the first time, since the War of 1812, that the Government had left the District of Colum-
bia. Id. President Eisenhower addressed the nation from his bunker: "[W]e are here to deter-
mine whether or not the Government is prepared in time of emergency to continue the function
of government so that there will be no interruption in the business that must be carried on." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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attack.76 Public corporations, such as Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany, amended their corporate bylaws to prepare for possible nuclear
annihilation of their boards of directors.77 And the terms "fallout
shelter" and "bunker" entered the national lexicon with stories about
preparing for nuclear attack appearing in Good Housekeeping and
Business Week.78
The federal government's preoccupation with nuclear war and con-
tinuity of government planning would later come to be directed at
state and local governments. Central planning officials came to be-
lieve that the "development of the capability by State... governments
to continue functioning in times of emergency will assure, to the great-
est degree possible, that the invocation of martial law will not be nec-
essary."'79 Thus, in 1957, the Federal Civil Defense Administration
(FCDA) 8° announced a new focus concentrated on state government
survival following disaster.
The agency sought to develop "a long-range plan for building civil
defense operational capability into Government at all levels." 81 The
agency pledged to "concentrate its immediate efforts" on the
"[e]stablishment by state, county and city governments of emergency
lines of succession for top executives, legislators, the judiciary and key
personnel. '82 The "National Plan," as this focus on state continuity
planning would come to be known, focused the federal government's
energies on four major objectives in "order to assist State and local
governments in their preparations": the primary objective being the
76. See Washington Maps a Plan for Atomic-Bomb Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1951, at 133.
77. "[Alt the request of the United States Government," shareholders of Western Union Tele-
graph Company received proxy statements to amend the corporation bylaws "to provide that in
the event of an atomic attack or other calamity resulting in casualties that reduced the Board of
Directors to less than quorum a majority of the remaining Board members could fill vacancies in
the Board." Beebe, supra note 56, at 151 n.26.
78. See RosE, supra note 23, at 1. Perhaps best illustrative of this fact, "[i]n 1961 even Sunset
magazine ran a story on fallout shelters tucked in among such articles as 'Transforming
Leftovers: The Sauce is the Secret' and 'How to Display and Store Magazines."' Id.
79. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at iii. The states were also viewed
as having an important role in the event of an attack. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 established the FDCA as an independent federal
agency charged with the task of "develop[ing] protection for the civilian population." COMP-
TROLLER GEN., supra note 56, at 1. For a brief overview of the history of federal civil defense
agencies through 1978, see id. at 1-2.
81. See Changes Mapped in Civil Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1957, at 70 (emphasis added).
The FCDA shifted its focus from a "crash" (immediate response) focus to one of long-term
government continuity. See id.
82. Id.
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"[e]stablishment of emergency lines of succession for top government
executives, legislators, the judiciary, and other key personnel. '8 3
In California, meanwhile, legislators were already attuned to the
potential succession problems that would be posed by a successful
missile attack. It was believed that California's "population centers,
defense manufacturing, and military bases" made the state an "impor-
tant [enemy] war target. '8 4 The state's geography and temperate cli-
mate would provide its citizens no quarter. One commentator noted
California's "fine weather would not hinder attack from the air" and
"[i]ts long coast line makes it particularly vulnerable to enemy attack
launched by submarine. '8 5 In October 1957, at the request of the Cal-
ifornia Legislature, the State Bar appointed a special committee to
"investigate the necessity for amendments to the state Constitution to
assure the preservation and operation of the state government after
an enemy attack and to draft any required constitutional amend-
ments. ' '8 6 The result of these efforts was "Amendment No. 5," which
appeared on the November 4, 1958 ballot.8 7 Amendment No. 5 pro-
posed to add "an enabling provision" to the state constitution author-
izing the California Legislature "to adopt wartime disaster laws" and
laws "providing for filling offices of legislators or governor in case of
death or disabling injury of one-fifth of legislators or incumbent gov-
ernor. ' 88 Voters approved the amendment overwhelmingly.8 9
B. Federal Influence
Perhaps inspired by California's successful effort to amend its state
constitution, the federal government recognized the need for states to
plan legislative succession through state constitutional amendment
83. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at ii-iii. The remaining objectives
included: the "[p]reservation of essential records"; "[e]stablishment of emergency locations for
government operations"; and the "[flull use of all personnel, facilities, and equipment of govern-
ments for emergency operations." Id.
84. James W. Beebe, Law and the H-Bomb, 33 J. ST. B. CAL. 348, 348 (1958).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 350. The official name of the committee was "The State Bar of California Commit-
tee to Assist the Assembly Subcommittee on Impact of Enemy Attack on Economy and Consti-
tutional Government of the State of California." Id. at 358 n.47.
87. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION: PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAWS To-
GETHER WITH ARGUMENTS 10-11 (Ralph N. Kleps ed., 1958), available at http://traynor.uchast-
ings.edu/ballotpdf/1958g.pdf.
88. Id. at 10. The measure also provided "for [the] convening of general or extraordinary
legislative sessions," for elections to fill vacancies, and for the temporary location of the capital.
Id.
89. See STATE OF CAL., STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 4, 1958, at 29
(Frank M. Jordan ed., 1958) (noting amendment passed by vote of 8,247,586 "Yes" to 902,328
"No").
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and set out to convince states to adopt their own provisions governing
succession during enemy attack.
The federal government, through its Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization, distributed a "model" continuity of government provi-
sions to state officials and urged each state to amend their constitu-
tions to include the model provision.90 The Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization, believed it was necessary to amend every state
constitution in order for legislatures to have the legitimate authority
to adopt statutes planning for legislative continuity.91 Thus, the
agency, "with the assistance of the Columbia Legislative Drafting Re-
search Fund of [the] Columbia University Council for Atomic Age
Studies," drafted a model continuity of government provision for
states to adopt into their respective state constitutions. 92 The model
provision was subsequently reviewed by the Council of State Govern-
ments, which gave the model "its full endorsement. ' 93 A 1959 publica-
tion by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization forwarded the
model to the states accompanied by commentary summarizing the
provision and urging its adoption. 94 States were urged to add the
model provision to their constitutions. 95 The text of the model, as in-
cluded in the 1959 publication, read:
90. This is not the first time in the nation's history that the federal government sought to
influence the content of state constitutions. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission:
Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 119 (2004) (discussing conditions imposed by Congress on the admission of new
states since the early 1800s). Nevertheless, the adoption by states of the federally drafted con-
tinuity of government provisions may represent the first time a federal agency actively (and
successfully) lobbied states to amend their respective constitutions.
91. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 1 ("All States will undoubtedly
find it necessary to modify their constitutions in order to adopt all portions. This is particularly
true with respect to legislative succession. However, adoption of the suggested constitutional
amendment ... would provide ample constitutional authority for enactment of all of the legisla-
tive proposals."). Existing state constitutional provisions regulating the filling of legislative va-
cancies were viewed as inharmonious with legislative continuity of government planning. See id.
at 7-8.
92. See id. at iii. The federal government also drafted model statutes to accompany the consti-
tutional provisions. See id. In his letter of introduction, Director Leo A. Hoegh of the Office of
Civil and Defense Mobilization noted that the suggested legislation was prepared "in response to
the recommendations of the Conference of Governors, the National Association of County Offi-
cials, the American Municipal Association and the U.S. Conference of Mayors." LEO A.
HOEGH, Foreword to OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61.
93. Id. at iv. The provision was officially included as part of the Council of State Govern-
ment's program of suggested state legislation for 1959. See COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, SUG-
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION: PROGRAM FOR 1959, at 50-52 (1958).
94. See generally OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61.
95. See, e.g., JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
124 (1993) (noting that this provision "was urged upon Arizona by the federal civil defense
authorities"). The FCDA also urged states to adopt model legislation on legislative succession.
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The Legislature, in order to insure continuity of state and local gov-
ernmental operations in periods of emergency resulting from disas-
ters caused by enemy attack, shall have the power and the
immediate duty (1) to provide for prompt and temporary succession
to the powers and duties of public offices, of whatever nature and
whether filled by election or appointment, incumbents of which may
become unavailable for carrying on the powers and duties of such
offices, and (2) to adopt such other measures as may be necessary
and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations.
In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred the Legislature shall
in all respects conform to the requirements of this Constitution ex-
cept to the extent that in the judgment of the Legislature so to do
would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay.96
The model intended to grant legislatures two powers.97 The first
power-"to provide for prompt temporary succession to the powers
and duties of public offices, of whatever nature and whether filled by
election or appointment, incumbents of which may become unavaila-
ble for carrying on the powers and duties of such offices"-was aimed
at authorizing the legislature to adopt measures aimed at "keeping the
governmental machinery in operation," 98 i.e., allowing the adoption of
statutes providing for the temporary succession of legislative offices.
The drafters incorporated the phrase "of whatever nature" into the
model provision because they thought the language was "broad
enough" to allow a legislature to also adopt succession plans for itself
as well as for "judicial, executive, and administrative offices." 99 Ulti-
mately, they believed that this language would be sufficient to allow
the legislature to adopt measures aimed at repopulating itself where a
mass vacancy or incapacity has occurred. 100
The second power-"to adopt such other measures as may be nec-
essary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental opera-
See infra notes 176-181 and accompanying text (discussing the FCDA's advocacy of model stat-
utes to accompany the constitutional provision).
96. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 177.
97. The choice was made to grant these powers to legislatures, as opposed to a grant of power
to the executive or judicial branches of state government, out of respect for the plenary power of
the legislative branch:
Underlying the proposal is the assumption that on the inventiveness and sense of re-
sponsibility of the legislative branch rests the best and safest hope of a general plan for
maintaining governmental operations despite the disruptions which an attack may
cause. The proposal is built on and to a degree exemplifies the basic idea that in a
State-constituting as it does a government of inherent powers as compared to the
National Government as one of delegated powers-full power to govern resides in the
legislative branch.
Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1; see also infra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
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tions"' 01-purposefully modeled after the Federal Constitution's
Necessary and Proper Clause, sought to afford a legislature the flexi-
bility to adopt additional measures, not related to succession, but
rather related to the continuity of general government operations.1 02
It was intended to allow "for some modification . . . in the ordinary
play of the checks and balances involved in the distribution of powers
among the three coordinate branches. ' 103 In addition, the model's
necessary and proper clause was thought to allow the legislature the
means and authority to skirt other constitutional requirements in
times of enemy attack.1 4
The language and spirit of the model provision was meant to limit
the exercise of the legislature's use of its new emergency powers, how-
ever.10 5 First, the drafters purposefully phrased the model as a grant
of new power and not as a removal of limits on existing powers.106
Second, the model only permitted deviation of constitutional require-
ments where conforming to those requirements would be "impractica-
ble or would admit of undue delay," although this judgment was to be
left to the legislature itself without the possibility of judicial review.10 7
Third, the drafters recognized that in their use of continuity of govern-
101. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 177.
102. See id. at 9.
103. Id. The drafters explained: "It may well be, for example, that the Legislature will want
to delegate more power to the Governor than is normally permissible and thus bring about a
closer and more effective cooperation of the executive and legislative branches in the common
cause of coping with the emergency." Id.
104. The target of the clause was purposefully all-encompassing and broad:
In many states existing Constitutions are such that statutory provisions for governmen-
tal continuity necessitate an amendment of sufficient breadth to reach such matters as
quorum requirements in the Legislature, location of the seat of government, procedural
requirements for convening special sessions, privileges and immunities of public of-
ficers, their compensation and the like. So, the power granted by the amendment is
broad. It could not be otherwise considering the contingency to which it is addressed.
Id.
105. See id. ("[Tihe amendment gives no blank check to the Legislature.").
106. Id.
107. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 9. The drafters noted that
they intended to deny judicial review of a legislative decision deviating from requirements of the
state constitution. See id. at 9-10 ("[T]he determination of the question whether and how far to
deviate is entrusted to the judgment of the Legislature without recourse to the courts (as would
have been possible if the amendment spoke in terms of 'findings' by the Legislature) .... "). But
the drafters cautioned that a denial of judicial review "should not cause any great apprehen-
sion." Id. at 10 ("There is nothing novel in the idea that Legislatures may make decisions, in-
deed final decisions, on constitutional questions. As a matter of fact, the trend in the Supreme
Court of the United States is toward a larger acceptance of the legislative judgment as to the
permissible range of legislative power."
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ment powers, legislators would still be constrained in their lawmaking
by the Federal Constitution's minimum standards. 108
C. Widespread Adoption of Continuity Provisions
A total of thirty-five states ratified varying forms of the federal
model between the years 1959 and 1966.109 Sixteen states adopted
provisions identical or closely analogous to the federal model: Ari-
zona,110 Delaware,'11 Florida,112 Idaho, 1 3 Massachusetts,' 14 Mon-
tana, 1" 5 Nebraska," 6 Nevada,11 7 New Jersey,11 8 New York,119 Ohio,l20
108. See OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 10 ("[T]he Constitution
and laws of the United States ... are unaffected by changes in the Constitutions of the States.
Whatever freedom of action the Legislature of a given State may have under the proposed
amendment in dealing with governmental machinery and operations, the Constitution of the
United States stands guard against anything it may do in abridgment of the rights of individu-
als."). Thus, in the "extreme example, that a piece of state legislation might undermine or devi-
ate from the State's own Bill of Rights, it would still have to undergo the test of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... ." Id.
109. The following is a list of the thirty-five states that adopted a "continuity of government"
amendment (included next to each state is the year of ratification of the amendment): Alabama
(1961); Arizona (1962); California (1966); Connecticut (1965); Delaware (1961); Florida (1964);
Georgia (1964); Idaho (1960); Kansas (1960); Louisiana (1962); Maine (1960); Massachusetts
(1964); Michigan (1959); Minnesota (1960); Missouri (1960); Montana (1966); Nebraska (1960);
Nevada (1964); New Hampshire (1960); New Jersey (1961); New Mexico (1960); New York
(1963); North Dakota (1962); Ohio (1961); Oklahoma (1962); Pennsylvania (1963); Rhode Island
(1962); South Carolina (1961); South Dakota (1960); Texas (1962); Utah (1964); Virginia (1962);
Washington (1962); West Virginia (1960); and Wisconsin (1961).
It should be noted that Virginia's modern state constitution was adopted in 1971, but the
continuity of government provision preceded the modern constitution, having been added to the
Commonwealth's 1902 constitution in 1962. See 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTrrUTION OF VIRGINIA 24, 508 (1974). Also of note, although California adopted a con-
tinuity measure in 1958, prior to the federal model being distributed to the states, see supra
notes 84-89, the language was "streamlined" in 1966, JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFOR-
NIA STATE CONSTrrUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 104 (1993). The streamlined language appears
to have brought the measure closer in line with the federal model.
110. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 25.
111. See DEL. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
112. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
113. See IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 27.
114. See MASS. CONST. art. LXXXIII.
115. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. V, § 46 (1966). The language was subsequently stream-
lined with the adoption of Montana's new state constitution in 1972. See MONT. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; see also LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 91 (2001) (noting that the 1972 provision was "derived from and similar to"
the 1966 amendment).
116. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 29.
117. See NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 37.
118. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VI, para. 4.
119. See N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 25.
120. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 42.
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Oklahoma, 121 South Carolina,122 South Dakota,12 3 West Virginia, 124
and Wisconsin. 125
Four states-Kansas, 126  Maine, 127  New Hampshire,12 8  and
Utah129-added additional language to their continuity of government
necessary and proper clauses. That additional language permits their
legislatures "to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and
proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations includ-
ing but not limited to, the financing thereof'-presumably to allow the
incurring of debt or the suspension of constitutional rules regarding
the use or appropriation of public monies. The constitutions of North
Dakota 130 and Rhode Island131 include similar financing clauses.
Some states sought to limit legislatures' powers in a variety of ways.
Two states-Connecticut 132 and Louisiana l 33-adopted the federal
model with the power "to provide for prompt temporary succession,"
but did not adopt the model's necessary and proper clause. Texas
adopted both the succession and necessary and proper powers, but
that state's provision bars the legislature from legislating away rights
and protections contained within the Texas Bill of Rights.134 Washing-
ton's provision specifically references constitutional restrictions that
the legislature may "depart from" in times of emergency; the provi-
sion is notable for the emergency powers not enumerated and there-
121. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 63.
122. See S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 12.
123. See S.D. CONST. art. II1, § 29.
124. See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 54.
125. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 34.
126. See KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 13.
127. See ME. CONST. art. IX, § 17.
128. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. 5-A.
129. See UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 30. This provision was subsequently amended in 1972 and
1990. See JEAN BICKMORE WHITE, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 87
(1998).
130. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 7. The North Dakota Constitution authorizes the legislature
"to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and proper for ensuring the continuity of
governmental operations including, but not limited to, waiver of constitutional restrictions upon
... expenditures, loans or donations of public moneys." Id.
131. See R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 21 ("During said period of emergency the general assembly
shall have the power to incur state debts exceeding the limitation set forth in Sections 16 and 17
of this article.").
132. See CoNN. CONST. art. 11th, § 3.
133. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 11.
134. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 62 ("Article I of the Constitution of Texas, known as the 'Bill
of Rights' shall not be in any manner affected, amended, impaired, suspended, repealed or sus-
pended hereby."). This special clause was added to the Texas provision in order to ensure that
the protections granted in Texas' Bill of Rights remained "definite." H. Bascom Thomas, Refer-
endum: Continuity of Government in Disaster, 25 TEX. B.J. 9, 9-10 (1962).
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fore not granted to the legislature by reference, namely, other
constitutional provisions related to gubernatorial succession. 135
Three states require elections to be held as soon as possible or oth-
erwise cap the amount of time legislatures are permitted to invoke
continuity powers. Michigan's provision mirrors the federal model
but adds an additional requirement that elections be called "as soon as
possible to fill any vacancies in elective offices temporarily occupied
by operation of any legislation enacted pursuant to the [continuity of
government provision]. ' 136 Missouri's Constitution contains similar
language. 137 The Rhode Island provision caps the amount of time
(two years) that powers under the provision can be exercised. 138
Six states-Alabama, Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia-adopted continuity of government provisions,
but those states' provisions do not resemble the federal model. Min-
nesota's provision is similar to the federal model in its grant of powers
to the legislature, but it is worded differently and omits language au-
thorizing deviation from other constitutional requirements. 139 Penn-
135. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 42. The relevant portion of the Washington provision
provides:
Legislation enacted under the powers conferred by this amendment shall in all respects
conform to the remainder of the Constitution: Provided, That if, in the judgment of the
legislature at the time of disaster, conformance to the provisions of the Constitution
would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay, such legislation may depart
during the period of emergency caused by enemy attack only, from the following sec-
tions of the Constitution:
Article 14, Sections 1 and 2, Seat of Government;
Article 2, Sections 8, 15 (Amendments 13 and 32), and 22, Membership, Quorum of
Legislature and Passage of Bills;
Article 3, Section 10 (Amendment 6), Succession to Governorship: Provided, That the
legislature shall not depart from Section 10, Article III, as amended by Amendment 6,
of the state Constitution relating to the Governor's office so long as any successor
therein named is available and capable of assuming the powers and duties of such office
as therein prescribed;
Article 3, Section 13, Vacancies in State Offices;
Article 11, Section 6, Vacancies in County Offices;
Article 11, Section 2, Seat of County Government;
Article 3, Section 24, State Records.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
136. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 39 (first adopted in 1959-language later streamlined).
137. See Mo. CONST. art. III, § 46(a) ("[E]lections shall always be called as soon as possible to
fill any elective vacancies in any office temporarily occupied by operation of any legislation
enacted pursuant to the provisions of this section.").
138. See R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 21 ("The powers granted and the laws enacted under this sec-
tion shall not be effective after two years following the inception of an enemy attack.").
139. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 5. The Minnesota Constitution provides:
The legislature may provide by law for the case of the removal, death, resignation, or
inability both of the governor and lieutenant governor to discharge the duties of gover-
nor and may provide by law for continuity of government in periods of emergency
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sylvania's 140 and Georgia's 41 provisions are also worded differently.
New Mexico's provision uses the term "disaster emergency" and re-
quires a declaration by the President of the United States of such an
emergency as well as the institution of "martial law" as preconditions
for invocation of the provision. 142 Alabama's provision allows only
for the interim succession of legislators and sets limitations on when
they may serve. 143 Finally, Virginia's Constitution does not have a
resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack in this state, including but not limited
to, succession to the powers and duties of public office and change of the seat of
government.
Id.
140. See PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 25. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The General Assembly may provide, by law, during any session, for the continuity of
the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the government of the Common-
wealth, and its political subdivisions, and the establishment of emergency seats thereof
and any such laws heretofore enacted are validated. Such legislation shall become ef-
fective in the event of an attack by an enemy of the United States.
Id.
141. See GA. CoNsT. art. III, § 6, 1 2(a)(4). The Georgia Constitution affords the legislature,
under the branch's "specific powers," the power to provide for "[t]he continuity of state and
local governments in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack in-
cluding but not limited to the suspension of all constitutional legislative rules during such emer-
gency." Id.
142. See N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 2. That provision reads:
In addition to the powers herein enumerated, the legislature shall have all powers nec-
essary to the legislature of a free state, including the power to enact reasonable and
appropriate laws to guarantee the continuity and effective operation of state and local
government by providing emergency procedure for use only during periods of disaster
emergency. A disaster emergency is defined as a period when damage or injury to
persons or property in this state, caused by enemy attack, is of such magnitude that a
state of martial law is declared to exist in the state, and a disaster emergency is declared
by the chief executive officer of the United States and the chief executive officer of this
state, and the legislature has not declared by joint resolution that the disaster emer-
gency is ended. Upon the declaration of a disaster emergency the chief executive of the
state shall within seven days call a special session of the legislature which shall remain
in continuous session during the disaster emergency, and may recess from time to time
for more than three days.
Id.
143. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 46.01. That provision provides:
The legislature may provide for the continuity of the legislature of the state of Alabama
and the representation therein of each of the political subdivisions of the state in the
event of an attack by an enemy of the United States, by providing for the selection of
emergency interim legislators who shall be designated for temporary succession to the
powers and duties but not the office of a legislator in case of such emergency. Such
emergency interim legislator may serve only when the legislator in whose stead he is
authorized to serve has died or is unable temporarily for physical, mental or legal rea-
sons to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of his office, and until such time as
the elected legislator is able to resume the duties of his office, or in case of a vacancy in
such office a successor has been elected in accordance with section 46 of this
Constitution.
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traditional "continuity of government" provision, but does allow for
the suspension of legislative quorum requirements in the event of an
enemy attack on the "soil" of that state.144
All thirty-five of the amendments were adopted within a period of
seven years and with little recorded opposition.145 Presumably, ratifi-
cation occurred quickly in light of pressure from the federal govern-
ment, 146 as well as the fact that many states expressed a belief they
were vulnerable to attack.147 The comment accompanying Texas's
1962 continuity of government amendment exemplifies the concern of
state governments at the time: "The atomic age, with its constant
threat of massive destruction, especially of life, poses the serious prob-
lem of how to provide for emergency continuation of state and local
governments in the event of the complete annihilation of such govern-
144. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 8. The Virginia Constitution provides:
A majority of the members elected to each house shall constitute a quorum to do busi-
ness, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and shall have power to com-
pel the attendance of members in such manner and under such penalty as each house
may prescribe. A smaller number, not less than two-fifths of the elected membership
of each house, may meet and may, notwithstanding any other provision of this Consti-
tution, enact legislation if the Governor by proclamation declares that a quorum of the
General Assembly cannot be convened because of enemy attack upon the soil of
Virginia.
Id. But the provision adds a caveat as to the effectiveness of legislation passed under suspended
quorum: "Such legislation shall remain effective only until thirty days after a quorum of the
General Assembly can be convened." Id.
145. As of 1962, eighteen states ratified the amendments by "overwhelming majorities" and
"[i]n o case has such an amendment failed of ratification." Thomas, supra note 134, at 10.
Idaho's continuity of government provision, for example, was adopted with 77.2% of the vote.
See Election Div., Idaho Sec'y of State, Idaho Constitutional Amendment History, http://www.
idsos.state.id.us/ELECT/inits/hst60_70.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2009). Provisions met similar
electoral success in Minnesota and Rhode Island. See DEBORAH K. McKNIGHT, MINNESOTA
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: FREQUENCY, NUMBER AND RATIFICATION RATES: AN
ANALYSIS 23 (2004), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/mnconst.pdf (noting
Minnesota's continuity of government provision passed by a vote of 974,486 in favor to 305,245
against); PATRICK T. CONLEY & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., THE RHODE ISLAND STATE CON-
STITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 203 (2007) (noting Rhode Island's continuity of government
provision passed by a vote of 96,071 in favor to 60,983 against). An editorial in The New York
Times noted that New York's continuity of government provision had "no known opposition" in
the 1963 referenda election. Editorial, Yes on Amendments 1, 2 and 3, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1963,
at 40; see also Douglas Dales, State Will Vote on 7 Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1963, at 20
(noting that "[little general interest has been evoked" by ballot proposals in the year that New
York's continuity of government provision was approved); cf. Raymond J. Arata, Government
Functions: Wartime Disaster (ACA 5), 34 J. COMMONWEALTH CLUB CAL. 1, 41-43 (1958) (not-
ing technical, definitional and functional problems with California's proposed constitutional
amendment but recommending a "YES" vote on the question of adopting the proposed
amendment).
146. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Charles R. Adrian, Trends in State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 336
(1968) ("The possibility of nuclear attack in the event of war has been a matter of concern for a
large number of states in the 1960's.").
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ment personnel who have been regularly elected or appointed. 1' 48
The provisions were also likely adopted because of the federal govern-
ment's lobbying efforts and the Council of State Government's full
endorsement of the measure. 149
D. Application of These Provisions
Continuity of government provisions (thankfully) have never been
successfully invoked and appear to not have been interpreted by the
courts. 150 The official ballot questions as presented to the electorate
when the provisions were voted on, ordinarily a tool of constitutional
interpretation, offer little further guidance on the meaning of these
provisions. a51 Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the provisions them-
selves provides insight on when and in what circumstances they might
apply.
In eighteen states, continuity of government provisions can only be
invoked "in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by
148. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 62 cmt.
149. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS, THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFER-
ENCE GUIDE 185 (1995) (noting that West Virginia's provision "has never been invoked");
MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 69 (1993)
(noting that Nevada's provision "has not been subject to interpretation"); CONLEY & FLANDERS,
supra note 145, at 203 (noting that "[t]hankfully, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not yet
had any occasion to review [Rhode Island's provision]"); ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 115, at
91 ("There are no cases interpreting [Montana's provision]."); SUSAN P. FINO, THE MICHIGAN
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 94 (1996) ("There have been no interpretations of
[Michigan's provision]."); LESHY, supra note 95, at 124 (noting that Arizona's continuity of gov-
ernment provisions has "happily ... not been invoked"); ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J.
LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 79 (1993) (noting that
Nebraska's provision has "never been tested"); JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITU-
TION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 118 (1997) (noting that Wisconsin's provision "has neither been
amended nor litigated"); MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFER-
ENCE GUIDE 149 (1992) (noting that "[f]ortunately,... the courts have not interpreted" Maine's
provision); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 72 (1990) (noting that New Jersey's provision "has not been the subject of judicial
interpretation").
151. A review of official ballot questions for continuity of government provisions provides no
additional insight as to how these provisions should practically operate. For example, the ballot
provision in Louisiana, where voters adopted a close analogue of the federal model, read as
follows:
FOR the proposed amendment to Article II, of the Louisiana Constitution to add
thereto a new Section 3, authorizing the Legislature to insure continuity of state and
local government in emergency periods resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack
by providing prompt, temporary succession to public offices and adoption of those
measures necessary for the continuity of governmental agencies.
1962 La. Acts No. 505, § 3.
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enemy attack.' 52 Provisions in three states-Florida, Washington,
and Wisconsin-are worded differently but have similar requirements
for invocation.' 53 The constitutions of Alabama and Pennsylvania do
not require that a "period of emergency" even exist: in those states,
there need only be "an attack by an enemy of the United States."'1 54
Three state constitutions-Idaho, 55 Nebraska, t 56 and Oklahoma' 57-
allow for invocation of continuity provisions even where an enemy
attack has not yet occurred, i.e., where only the "threat" of such an
attack is "imminent."
Despite the use of the phrase "enemy attack" in the majority of
state constitutions, no state constitutions textually define the phrase.
Nine states, however, define the term "attack" within their statutory
codes. Those states define the phrase as "any action or series of ac-
tions taken by an enemy of the United States resulting in substantial
damage or injury to persons or property in this state whether through
sabotage, bombs, missiles, shellfire or atomic, radiological, chemical,
bacteriological, biological or other [means, weapons, or methods]."' 58
Other states have adopted substantially similar statutory definitions
152. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 25; CONN. CONST. art. l1th, § 3 (minor word variation);
DEL. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, 2(a)(4); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 13; ME.
CONST. art. IX, § 17; MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIII (identical in all respects except the
term "disaster" is used in the singular form); MNN. CONST. art. V, § 5; NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 37;
N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. 5-A; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, 4; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 7; OHIO CONSr.
art. II, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 29; TEX.
CONST. art. III, § 62; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 54.
153. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (authorizing invocation "[i]n periods of emergency resulting
from enemy attack"); WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 42 (authorizing invocation "in periods of emer-
gency resulting from enemy attack"); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 34 (authorizing invocation "in peri-
ods of emergency resulting from enemy action in the form of an attack").
154. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 46.01; PA. CONST. art. III, § 25.
155. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 27 ("in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by
enemy attack or in periods of emergency resulting from the imminent threat of such disasters"
(emphasis added)).
156. NEB. CONST. art. IlI, § 29(1) ("in periods of emergency resulting from enemy attack upon
the United States, or the imminent threat thereof' (emphasis added)).
157. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 63 ("resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack or in peri-
ods of emergency resulting from the imminent threat of such disasters" (emphasis added)).
158. The definition of "attack" is virtually identical in the statutes of all nine states. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-382 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-6-103(1) (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 1703(1) (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-415(a) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-1203(d) -
1303(a) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:63(1) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-5-20(a) (2005); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 304.002 (Vernon 2005); W. VA. CODE § 15-7-3(a) (2004).
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with slight word variations. 159 Courts routinely defer to a state legisla-
ture's interpretation of its own state constitution. 160
The invocation of continuity of government powers may not require
that the enemy attack actually occur within the state's political bound-
aries. 161 One commentator has suggested that a terrorist bombing in
New York, for example, may be sufficient to trigger the South Caro-
lina General Assembly's continuity of government powers. 162 Such an
interpretation of these provisions has never been tested. Neverthe-
less, it seems that an invocation of emergency powers within one state,
on the basis of an enemy attack in (or threat of an enemy attack
against)1 63 another state should be limited. Most continuity of gov-
ernment clauses require both: (1) that the measures passed by the
legislature under the power be "necessary and proper" for insuring
159. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 31.2(c) (2004) (defining "enemy attack" as "any attack or
series of attacks by a power hostile to the United States which causes or may cause death, injury
or substantial damage to the people and property in the United States by sabotage, or by the use
of bombs, missiles or shells, or any other weapons of conventional, atomic, radiological, chemi-
cal, bacteriological, biological or any other nature, process or means"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 161.01(D) (LexisNexis 2007) (defining "attack" as "any attack or series of attacks by an enemy
of the United States causing, or which may cause, substantial damage or injury to civilian prop-
erty or persons in the state in any manner by sabotage or by the use of bombs, missiles, shellfire,
or atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological, or biological means or other weapons or
processes").
160. 2 FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 100, 128
n.118 (2006) (citing Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665, 669-70 (Fla.
1970) (deferring to non-contemporaneous, specific legislative interpretation of the state constitu-
tion contrary to prior judicial interpretations)). But see Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lec-
ture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
189, 226-27 (2002) (citing Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1988) (refusing to defer to
a legislature's interpretation of a state constitutional term)).
161. But see MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 39 (authorizing invocation "in periods of emergency
only, resulting from disasters occurring in this state caused by enemy attack on the United
States" (emphasis added)); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 46(a) (same); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (au-
thorizing invocation during "a period when damage or injury to persons or property in this state,
caused by enemy attack" (emphasis added)); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (authorizing the suspension
of legislative quorum requirements in the event of "enemy attack upon the soil of Virginia"
(emphasis added)). New Mexico's provision-by far the most restrictive of any state-further
requires that the "damage or injury" be "of such magnitude that a state of martial law is declared
to exist in the state and [that] a disaster emergency is declared by the chief executive officer of
the United States and the chief executive officer of this state." N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (empha-
sis added).
162. See COLE BLEASE GRAHAM, JR., THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REF-
ERENCE GUIDE 94 (2007) ("Article XVII, section 12 provides for actions by the General Assem-
bly as needed in case of enemy attack. A terrorist bombing as in New York in 2001 may trigger
such action by the General Assembly .... ").
163. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text (compiling the provisions of Idaho, Ne-
braska, and Oklahoma, which allow invocation of continuity of government powers when the
possibility of attack is "imminent").
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continuity of government; and (2) that the legislature continue to con-
form to the state constitution unless conformance would be "impracti-
cable" or "admit of undue delay."'1 64 It seems neither necessary,
proper, nor practicable for the South Carolina General Assembly to
suspend quorum and bill passage requirements in the event of an en-
emy attack in, for example, Hawaii. 165 In such a circumstance, South
Carolina would be corporeally unaffected by the attack occurring
more than 4500 miles away. However, this may be a closer question if
the attack occurs in a state bordering South Carolina, such as North
Carolina or Georgia.
The requirement that there be an "enemy attack"-a requirement
which exists in virtually every state with a continuity of government
provision 166-means that these provisions (and their resulting powers)
are wholly inapplicable in the event of a biological, natural, hydro-
meteorological, geological, or technological disaster not resulting from
an offensive attack by an enemy of the United States. 167 For example,
while there is scientific consensus that a tsunami will strike the north-
western United States coast,168 states affected by a tsunami would not
be able to exercise continuity powers because the tsunami was not
caused by an enemy, but rather by a series of naturally occurring
164. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 12 ("The General Assembly ... shall have the power
... (2) to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity
of governmental operations. In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred, the General As-
sembly shall in all respects conform to the requirements of this Constitution, except to the extent
that in the judgment of the General Assembly so to do would be impracticable or would admit of
undue delay." (emphasis added)).
165. It should also be noted that the legislatures of South Carolina, and nine other states, have
statutorily adopted a definition of "enemy attack" that seems to require the enemy attack, or its
resulting effects, to physically impact the state. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-5-20(a) (2005) (defining
an "attack" as "any action or series of actions taken by an enemy of the United States resulting
in substantial damage or injury to persons or property in this State" (emphasis added)); see also
supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
167. For a comprehensive database of over 12,800 mass disasters in the world occurring from
1900 to present, see Em-Dat: The International Emergency Disasters Database, http://www.em-
dat.be (last visited Apr. 28, 2009). Some scientists have reported that the global number of
naturally-occurring disasters has increased dramatically in recent years. See Ker Than, Scientists:
Natural Disasters Becoming More Common, LIVESCIENCE, Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://www.
livescience.com/environment/051017_natural-disasters.html (noting that "the total natural disas-
ters reported each year has been steadily increasing in recent decades, from 78 in 1970 to 348 in
2004"). Naturally occurring disasters cannot, in any imaginable light, be considered an "enemy
attack" against a state.
168. Editorial, One Year Later, Tsunami Lesson, BATON ROUGE ADvoc., Dec. 26, 2005, at
6B, available at 2005 WLNR 25552331 (" 'Scientists agree that it is not a question of if [a tsunami
is capable of touching the United States] will happen on the northwest coast but a question of
when."' (quoting tsunami researcher Kate Moran)). Tsunami waves originating in Cascadia
would reach Alaska in four hours time. Id.
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events. Similarly, if a disease, not the result of bioterrorism, were to
result in the mass incapacitation of a state legislature, continuity of
government powers could not be employed, and constitutional quo-
rum and other requirements could not be suspended where the consti-
tution requires an "enemy attack" to occur. 169
A number of states have amended their existing continuity of gov-
ernment clauses to address this problem by adopting an "all-hazards
approach," authorizing the application of continuity powers even in
the absence of an enemy attack. Louisiana, for example, amended its
constitution to delete references to "attack," thus broadening the pro-
vision to cover "any emergency."'1 70 New York's constitution allows
for the application of the continuity of government provision during
"periods of emergency caused by enemy attack or by disasters (natu-
ral or otherwise)."' 171 Montana 172 and Utah173 amended their provi-
sions to follow the all-hazards approach. These forward-thinking
states allow for the continuity of state government in times of emer-
gency even if it cannot be shown that an "enemy attack" occurred.
E. States Without Constitutional Provisions
Not every state added a continuity of government provision to its
constitution. The constitutions of fifteen states-Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyo-
ming-do not appear to have specific provisions allowing for
continuity of government. While a number of these state constitutions
169. This has not been subject to court interpretation and no current scholarship addresses
this issue.
170. Compare LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 2, § 3 (1962) ("in periods of emergency resulting from
disasters caused by enemy attack"), with LA. CONST. art. XII, § 11 (1974) ("in periods of emer-
gency"); see also LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITU-TON: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 193 (1991) ("[Section 11] continues the substance of a constitutional amendment adopted
in the civil defense-conscious 1960s that mandated and authorized the legislature to provide for
government during an emergency following an enemy attack. The current provision was ex-
panded to cover any emergency." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
171. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 25 (emphasis added).
172. Compare MoNT. CONST. of 1889, art. V, § 46 (1966) ("resulting from a disaster caused by
enemy attack"), with MONT. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1972) ("resulting from disasters or enemy at-
tack" (emphasis added)).
173. See UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 30 (authorizing application of the provision in circumstances
where "[state and local government] operations are seriously disrupted as a result of natural or
man-made disaster or disaster caused by enemy attack"). This came as a result of a 1990 amend-
ment. See WHITE, supra note 129, at 87. The previous version "made no provision for govern-
mental disruption by natural or man-made disaster." Id.
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provide for the relocation of the seat of government if necessary, 74
none of these fifteen constitutions appear to authorize the legislature
to suspend quorum requirements and other procedural rules that may
hamper the ability of the state legislatures to meet and conduct busi-
ness in times of crisis. Also, these fifteen states do not provide for
mechanisms of interim legislative succession in the face of mass inca-
pacitation. Thus, in the event of mass incapacitation of the legislature,
these states would need to depart from existing constitutional require-
ments as to the filling of vacancies and the procedural rules without a
constitutional grant of authority to do so. It is not surprising then that
a report commissioned for the Maryland Emergency Management
Agency in 2004 recommended that Maryland adopt a continuity of
government provision of its own.175
V. STATUTES PROVIDING FOR CONTINUITY OF
LEGISLATIVE OPERATIONS
A. State Continuity of Government Provisions Require
Legislative Action
Constitutional continuity of government provisions were not in-
tended to self-execute. Rather, these provisions were conceived as
"enabling measure[s], empowering the legislature to assure, as far as
possible, the continuity of governmental operations throughout the
State in periods of emergency resulting from enemy attack."'1 76 The
provisions, by their text, authorize legislatures to adopt legislation re-
lated to "the immediate establishment of lines of succession to the
powers and duties (though not the title) of public offices, of whatever
nature." 77
The drafters of the model constitutional provision specifically noted
that the model constitutional provision, as adopted by most states,
should be regarded only as
an enabling measure the purpose of which is to empower the Legis-
latures of the several States to insure as far as possible the con-
tinuity of governmental operations throughout the State ....
174. See infra note 291 (collecting state constitutional provisions authorizing the relocation of
the seat of state government); see also infra note 253 (collecting statutory enactments authoriz-
ing the relocation of the seat of state government).
175. See UNIV. OF MD. CTR. FOR HEALTH & HOMELAND SEC., CONTINUITY OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND 24 (2004) (recommending an amendment
to the Maryland Constitution providing for temporary succession "similar to those of other
states," but not recommending the inclusion of a "'necessary and proper' clause"). At the time
of this writing, Maryland has not yet adopted a continuity of government provision.
176. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 2 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
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[These provisions have] no self-executing provisions; [they] re-
quire[ ] legislative action. To stimulate such action, the amendment
expressly adds, coupled with the power, a duty to carry the power
into execution.1 78
Federal authorities and the Council of State Governments proposed
model legislation to accompany the model constitutional provision
they drafted. The Council of State Governments exerted pressure on
state authorities to enact the suggested legislation.179 "Diverse
groups" such as "The Conference of Chief Justices, The American Bar
Association, The AFL-CIO, The American Legion, The Veterans of
Foreign Wars, [and] Kiwanis [Club]" also "endorsed" the measures. 180
Interestingly, federal authorities directly lobbied state legislatures-
sending telegrams to the governors of twenty-six states, including New
York and Connecticut, urging adoption of these statutes.181 Among
other legislative enactments, this pressure resulted in the adoption of
both: (1) laws suspending quorum requirements in times of crisis; and
(2) laws creating a system of temporary successors. I now examine
both of these forms of enactments.
B. Legislative Enactments
1. Quorum Suspension
The Federal Constitution and every American state constitution re-
quires its legislative branch have a "quorum" or "majority of mem-
bers" physically present to meet and conduct business. 182 Modern
178. Id. at 7.
179. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, INDEX TO SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1958-1965,
at 10 (1970) ("States which have not adopted the legislation are urged to give favorable consider-
ation to its enactment.").
180. Thomas, supra note 134, at 10. The support by these organizations for continuity was
likely based on patriotism concerns. See, e.g., Gaither, supra note 74, at 425, 427 (calling "upon
the legal profession to assume the leadership in the struggle for control of the world between the
free nations and international Communism" and advocating that lawyers research issues related
to "[t]he functioning of government at all levels [since it] is a matter of vital concern to us as
lawyers and citizens").
181. See States Exhorted on Civil Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1961, at 30. Governors that
received telegrams, including the governors of New York and Connecticut, were from states
whose legislatures were at the time considering legislative enactments related to continuity of
government. Id.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 52; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12; ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 2. § 9; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 7(a); COLO. CONST. art.
V, § 11; CONN. CONST. art. 3d, § 12; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 4(a); GA.
CONST. art. I1, § IV, 1 III; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 10; ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 6(a); IND. CONST. art. 4, § 11; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 8; KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 8; Ky.
CONST. § 37; LA. CONST. art. III, § 10(A); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3d, § 3; MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 20; MASS. CONST. ch. I, § II, art. IX; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 14; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 13;
MIss. CONST. art. 4. § 54; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 20; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10(2); NEB. CONsT.
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quorum requirements trace their origins to England.1 83 In the ab-
sence of a quorum, transaction of legislative business must be immedi-
ately suspended. 184 State courts uniformly require strict adherence to
these provisions, routinely striking down legislation passed without a
quorum at the time of voting.185
Quorum requirements serve a variety of functions. They are mod-
ern reflections of the fact that the framers of state constitutions "have
been of a cautious nature somewhat distrustful of the legislature. 1 8 6
The requirements are "deemed essential to secure fairness of proceed-
ing, and to prevent matters from being concluded in a hasty manner,
or agreed to by so small a number of the members as not to command
a due and proper respect."'1 87
art. III, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 13; N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. 20th; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § IV,
2: N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. I1, § 11(1); N.D. CONST.
art. IV, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. II, §6; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 30; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 12; PA.
CONST. art. II, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9;
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 11; VT. CONST. ch.
II, § 14; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24; Wis.
CONST. art. IV, § 7; Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 11.
183. The term was first used in England in the documents commissioning justices of the peace:
The part of the document wherein the word occurs reads thus: "We have assigned you,
and every two or more of you, quorum aliquem vestrum, A, B, C, D, etc., unum esse
volumus,-i.e., of whom we will that any one of you, A, B or C, etc., shall be one." This
made it necessary that certain individuals, who, in the language of the commission,
were said to be of the quorum, should be present during the transaction of business.
LUTHER S. CUSHING, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: RULES OF PROCEEDING AND
DEBATE IN DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES 21 (1914) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMEN-
TARIES *352).
184. See, e.g., id. at 26 ("No business can regularly be entered upon until a quorum is present;
nor can any business be regularly proceeded with when it appears that the members present are
reduced below that number; ... if, at any time, in the course of the proceedings, notice is taken
that a quorum is not present ... the assembly must be immediately adjourned." (emphasis ad-
ded)); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PRO-
CEDURE § 504, para. 3 (5th ed. 2000) ("Whenever it is observed that a quorum is not present, any
member may call for the house to be counted and, if found deficient, business will be sus-
pended."); HENRY M. ROBERT III ET AL., ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED § 40, at
336 (10th ed. 2000) ("In the absence of a quorum, any business transacted ... is null and void.").
185. See, e.g., Bezio v. Neville, 305 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.H. 1973) (noting that the constitu-
tional provision for a fixed stated quorum of thirteen members of the New Hampshire Senate is
"mandatory" and "the particular actions voted upon [without adherence to the quorum require-
ment] were a nullity" (citing Opinion of the Justices, 153 A.2d 409 (N.H. 1959))). For similar
holdings by state supreme courts, see generally In re Opinion of the Justices, 276 A.2d 736 (Del.
1971); Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489 (N.Y. 1931); and Waldauer v. Britton, 113 S.W.2d 1178
(Tenn. 1938). This requirement is true in the context of municipal governing bodies as well. See
generally Quorum and Number of Votes Required to Act, 4 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 13.27.15
(3d ed. 2007) (collecting cases regarding municipal bodies).
186. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 10 (Vernon 2007) (Interpretive Commentary) (discussing con-
cerns particular to the Texas Constitution).
187. CUSHING, supra note 183, at 22; see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 10 (Vernon 2007) (Inter-
pretive Commentary) ("It has been the belief that it is necessary to make the quorum large in
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Quorum requirements can inhibit virtually all legislative business
from occurring where a disaster or attack has rendered a majority of
legislators unable to serve. Some state constitutions provide that a
quorum "is always based on the number of seats in the legislature. 188
In New Jersey, for example, the number of votes necessary to take
legislative action is not impacted by vacancies or absences. The New
Jersey Constitution requires "a majority of all [the legislature's] mem-
bers" to be present in order to conduct business. 189 This has been
construed by the New Jersey Attorney General to mean "the full
membership even if seats are vacant."' 90 The New Jersey Constitution
further requires that to pass a bill, "there shall be a majority of all the
members of each body personally present and agreeing thereto." 191
Thus, twenty-one votes in the Senate and forty-one votes in the As-
sembly are required to pass a bill-whether or not sixty-two members
of the state legislature are still living and otherwise able to attend a
voting session.192 Absent a continuity of government provision, if
there are not sixty-two surviving legislators, the State of New Jersey
would be unable to revise a statute or make an appropriation-its leg-
islature unable to take action as a body.
This is true in other states as well. The Florida Constitution's provi-
sion that "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum" has
been interpreted to mean "the entire number" of which the house
may be composed without deducting vacancies "from death, resigna-
tion, or failure to elect. '193 Delaware's constitution has been inter-
preted in a similar way. 194 The Indiana Constitution prohibits the
legislature from meeting to fill a vacancy in the Office of Governor or
order to prevent legislation from being carried through suddenly by minorities with little or no
deliberation."); ROBERT ET AL., supra note 184, § 3, at 20 ("The requirement of a quorum is a
protection against totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small
number of persons.").
188. 2 GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 160, at 56.
189. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § IV, 2.
190. WILLIAMS, supra note 150, at 64 (emphasis added) (citing Formal Opinion of N.J. Attor-
ney General, No. 3, Feb. 6, 1961).
191. N.J. CONsT. art. IV, § IV, 6.
192. See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE LEGISLATOR'S HAND-
BOOK 36 (2006-2007 ed.) (summarizing the votes required for various types of actions and noting
that "[t]he number of votes necessary to take these actions is not affected by vacancies or
absences").
193. In re Executive Communication of the 9th of November, A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653, 653 (Fla.
1868) (emphasis omitted).
194. See Opinion of the Justices, 251 A.2d 827, 827 (Del. 1969) (holding that a quorum refers
to the number of members prescribed by law regardless of whether "one or more vacancies have
occurred by reason of death, resignation, or otherwise").
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Lieutenant Governor unless and until "a sufficient number of the va-
cancies are filled to provide a quorum of members for that house. '195
State continuity of government provisions authorize state legisla-
tures to adopt laws suspending quorum requirements in the event of
an enemy attack.1 96 Only eleven states, however, have relied on con-
tinuity of government provisions to adopt legislation suspending quo-
rum requirements in the event of attack.' 97  Legislation which
suspends quorum requirements allows for the living and present legis-
lators to transact business and approve legislation-even where the
usual constitutional quorum requirements would otherwise not be sat-
isfied. Thus, for example, if Alabama's continuity of government pro-
195. See IND. CONST. art. 5, § 10(e). The full provision provides:
Whenever there is a vacancy in both the office of Governor and Lieutenant Governor,
the General Assembly shall convene in joint session forty-eight hours after such occur-
rence and elect a Governor from and of the same political party as the immediately
past Governor by a majority vote of each house. If either house of the General Assem-
bly is unable to assemble a quorum of its members because of vacancies in the member-
ship of that house, the General Assembly shall convene not later than forty-eight hours
after a sufficient number of the vacancies are filled to provide a quorum of members
for that house.
Id.
196. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, 2(4) (authorizing the legislature to suspend "all con-
stitutional legislative rules during such emergency"); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 29 (authorizing the
"suspension or temporary change of the provisions of this Constitution or of general law relating
to the length and purposes of any legislative session or prescribing the specific proportion or
number of legislators whose presence or vote is necessary to constitute a quorum or to accom-
plish any legislative act or function"); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 37 (authorizing "changes in quorum
requirements in the legislature"); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 62 (authorizing the Legislature to "sus-
pend procedural rules" that "relate to ... the percentage of each house of the Legislature neces-
sary to constitute a quorum"); WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 42 (authorizing the Legislature to
"depart" from constitutional provisions regarding "Membership, Quorum of Legislature and
Passage of Bills").
197. ALA. CODE § 29-3-13 (2008) ("In the event of an attack: (1) Quorum requirements for
the Legislature shall be suspended .... ); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-386(A) (2008) ("In the
event of an attack, the quorum requirement for the legislating body of the state ... shall be a
majority of the members of each body who convene for the session."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-6-
113 (2008) ("In the event of an attack: (1) Quorum requirements for the General Assembly
shall be suspended .... ); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-53 (2007) ("[T]he General Assembly... may
suspend the operation of any and all constitutional rules governing the procedure of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate as it deems necessary during the period of emergency
or disaster."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-425 (2007) ("In the event of an attack, (1) quorum re-
quirements for the legislature shall be suspended ...."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1312 (2006)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:74 (2007) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-606 (2007) ("If,
following an enemy attack, the legislature ... is unable to assemble a quorum ... then those
legislators . . . available for duty shall constitute the legislature ... and quorum requirements
shall be suspended."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-5-130 (2006) ("In the event of an attack, (1) quorum
requirements for the General Assembly shall be suspended ...."); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§ 304.011 (Vernon 2005) ("In the event of an attack, the quorum requirements imposed on the
legislature are suspended."); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.14.030 (2007) ("In the event of an attack,
(1) quorum requirements for the legislature shall be suspended .... ).
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vision were invoked and only three members of the State House of
Representatives attended a voting session-by the terms of Ala-
bama's statutory enactment, two members of the ordinarily 105-mem-
ber House could legally meet and vote to pass legislation.
It should be noted that quorum-suspending legislation would be su-
perfluous in a number of states where the constitutional quorum re-
quirement has been interpreted in a way to exclude vacant seats from
the quorum calculation. This is also true of other states, where the
express terms of the state constitutions suspend normal quorum re-
quirements if certain pre-conditions are met. 198
2. Interim Legislative Succession
Succession refers to "[t]he process established to list the order or
line of those entitled to succeed one another under emergency condi-
tions." 199 The National Governors Association's Center for Best
Practices has noted that an effective continuity of government plan
"establishes lines of succession of sufficient depth to ensure that offi-
cials can continue essential government functions. '' 2°° Continuity of
government provisions in state constitutions allow state legislatures to
adopt provisions related to the succession of individual legislative of-
fices in the event of mass incapacitation.
Eleven states have used continuity of government provisions to en-
act legislation providing for the naming of unelected "standby legisla-
tors"-who are authorized to step into the shoes of individual, duly
elected legislators in the event of an attack.20 1 Adopted as part of a
model law proposed by federal authorities and the Council of State
198. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. 20th ("A majority of the members of the house of
representatives shall be a quorum .... But when less than two-thirds of the representatives
elected shall be present, the assent of two-thirds of those members shall be necessary to render
their acts and proceedings valid."); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 ("A smaller number, not less than
two-fifths of the elected membership of each house, may meet and may, notwithstanding any
other provision of this Constitution, enact legislation if the Governor by proclamation declares
that a quorum of the General Assembly cannot be convened because of enemy attack upon the
soil of Virginia."). By contrast to the model continuity of government provision which was
adopted in a majority of states and was intended to enable legislatures to adopt legislation pro-
viding for continuity, see supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text, the New Hampshire and
Virginia constitutional provisions appear to be self-executing in nature.
199. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 45, at 2-4.
200. NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACrICES, supra note 30, at 5.
201. See ALA. CODE § 29-3-1 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-6-101 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 1701 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-50 (2008) (providing also for interim succession in
the executive branch and in all judgeships); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-423 (2008); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 48-1301 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:61 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 686.1 (2004);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-5-30 (2007); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 304.001 (Vernon 2008); W. VA.
CODE § 15-7-1 (2008).
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Governments, these states statutorily provide for a cadre of standby
legislators, formally known as "emergency interim successors," to
"temporarily exercise the legislator's powers and duties if the [incum-
bent] legislator [is] unavailable following an [enemy] attack. '202 Nota-
bly, those designated as standby legislators are not subject to election
or confirmation even though they possess the power to vote on state
legislation.
The model law, triggered only "in an emergency period following an
attack, '2 03 provides for "'automatic' continuity of the legislative
branch of a state. '204 Standby legislators provide a group of informed
persons charged with the duty of repopulating the legislature in times
of crisis. Assuming the incumbent and at least one of the designates
survives an attack, the law ensures that: (1) that there is no need to
summon volunteers during an emergency; and (2) those who are in a
position to act appear to act legitimately.
a. Designation
The model law provides for emergency interim succession to the
legislature and requires legislators-prior to an attack-to designate
at least three emergency interim successors and specify their order of
succession. 20 5 Although the legislator can revise her list at any time,
there must always be at least three successors designated at any mo-
ment.20 6 If a legislator fails to designate at least three successors, then
a party leader of the same house is required to make additional desig-
nations "to achieve such minimum number. ' 207
The designation becomes "effective when the legislator . . . files
with the secretary of state the successor's name, address and rank in
order of succession," which is then made open to the public.20 8 Any
changes in the order of succession will result in the secretary of state
notifying the governor, the state's emergency management agency, the
officials in charge of keeping the journals of the legislative bodies,
"and all emergency interim successors" of such changes.209 The offi-
202. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'-rs, supra note 93, at 36.
203. Cf. id. at 31 (stating point at which emergency interim succession applies to executive and
judicial branches).
204. Id. at 36.
205. Id. at 38 ("Each legislator shall designate not fewer than three nor more than seven
emergency interim successors to his powers and duties and specify their order of succession.").
206. Id. at 38-39 ("Each legislator shall review and, as necessary, promptly revise the designa-
tions of emergency interim successors to his powers and duties to insure that at all times there
are at least three such qualified emergency interim successors.").
207. Id. at 39.
208. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 93, at 39-40.
209. Id. at 40.
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cials in charge of the legislative branches are required to enter any
information received regarding emergency interim successors into the
"public journal at the beginning of each legislative session" and when-
ever changes or modifications are made to the succession order. 210
"Promptly" after designation, emergency interim legislative successors
are required to take the same oath of office that duly elected legisla-
tors are required to take, administered by an "appropriate person."21 1
b. Eligibility, Restrictions on Service, Responsibilities
Emergency interim successors must meet the same constitutional
and statutory qualifications as the incumbent legislator to be desig-
nated as an interim successor-e.g., residency, age, etc.-but
designates need not meet any constitutional restrictions on dual-office
holding. 212 Successors serve at the pleasure of the legislator designat-
ing them.2 1 3 The legislature itself determines, "in accordance with its
own rules," who is entitled to exercise the powers and assume the du-
ties of successors. 214 Emergency interim successors are subject to im-
peachment, censure, and removal.215 If the emergency interim
successor must serve because of an attack, her service is continuous
"until the incumbent legislator, an emergency interim successor higher
in order of succession, or a legislator appointed or elected and legally
qualified can act" and becomes available to act. 216
Emergency interim successors have a continuing "duty"-even in
times of peace-to "keep ... generally informed as to the duties, pro-
cedures, practices and current business of the legislature. '217 Cur-
210. Id.
211. Id. ("Promptly after designation each emergency interim successor shall take the oath[s]
required for the legislator to whose powers and duties he is designated to succeed. No other
oath shall be required. The oath shall be administered [by any person authorized by law to
administer the oath to duly elected legislators].").
212. Id. at 39 ("No person shall be designated or serve as an emergency interim successor
unless he may under the constitution and statutes hold the office of the legislator to whose.
powers and duties he is designated to succeed, but no constitutional or statutory provision
prohibiting a legislator from holding another office or prohibiting the holder of another office
from being a legislator shall be applicable to an emergency interim successor.").
213. Id. ("An emergency interim successor shall serve at the pleasure of the legislator
designating him or of any subsequent incumbent of the legislative office.").
214. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 93, at 40.
215. See id. at 40-41 ("All constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to ouster of a
legislator shall be applicable to an emergency interim successor who is exercising the powers and
assuming the duties of a legislator.").
216. Id. at 40.
217. See id.
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rently, duly elected legislators are required to "assist [the] emergency
interim successors to keep themselves so informed. '218
c. Elevation
In the event the law is invoked, emergency interim successors as-
sume "the powers and duties, but not the office, of a legislator. 219
The successor also receives the "privileges and immunities of a legisla-
tor," presumably these "privileges and immunities" would include
protection from arrest while traveling to and from a place of session
and compensation for travel.220 The maximum time the law can be
invoked, and emergency interim successors can serve, is two years.22'
A "designate" is elevated to "successor-status" where there is an
"enemy attack" and that attack renders the incumbent legislator "un-
available." The use of the phrase "enemy attack" is consistent with
the language of continuity of government provisions in most states.222
"Attack" is defined in the model legislation to mean:
[A]ny action or series of actions taken by an enemy of the United
States resulting in substantial damage or injury to persons or prop-
erty in this state whether through sabotage, bombs, missiles, shell-
fire, or atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological, or biological
means or other weapons or methods.223
The governor of a state is authorized to convene the legislature
where there is an attack, or if the governor fails to call for the legisla-
ture, the legislature automatically convenes ninety days following the
attack.224 Each emergency interim successor, "unless he is certain that
the legislator to whose powers and duties he is designated to succeed
or any emergency interim successor higher in order of succession will
not be unavailable," is required to "proceed to the place of session as
expeditiously as practicable. ' 225 An incumbent legislator is "unavaila-
218. Id.
219. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 21.
220. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 93, at 41. It is unclear from the model statute's
text the scope of this immunity and whether the interim legislative successor would enjoy other
legislative immunities such as speech and debate immunity.
221. Id. Some states have statutorily varied the maximum time of service. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 29-3-14 (2008) (capping service of successors to two years, that can be extended by
action of Governor for additional year).
222. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
223. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 93, at 38 (emphasis added). Because of the use
of the phrase "in this state," states that follow the model definition would not be able to trigger
interim legislative succession statutes when a neighboring state is the subject of enemy attack-
the attack must be on the state's own soil. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
224. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 93, at 40.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
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ble" when she is absent from the emergency legislative session or "un-
able, for physical, mental or legal reasons to exercise her powers. '226
d. Constitutionality
Some have expressed the view that interim legislative succession
statutes could not survive scrutiny by courts. The argument against
the constitutionality of these provisions is that the state constitution
bestows the powers of an office only to the person elected, and thus,
extending legislative powers to someone unelected likely violates ex-
isting state constitution provisions. 227 In addition, all state constitu-
tions already provide for the filling of ordinary legislative vacancies
through writs of election or other means, and the designation of emer-
gency interim legislative successors appears contrary to these provi-
sions.228 Even the commentary to the model legislation admits that
the premise behind interim successors "differs from usual provisions
relating to the filling of legislative vacancies. '229
There are two arguments, however, which support the constitution-
ality of interim successors in states where a continuity of government
provision exists in the state constitution. First, interim legislative suc-
cession statutes are not laws with respect to the filling of vacancies-
the successor "does not hold title to the office," but merely exercises
the power and duties of the office. 230 In this way, they are not con-
trary to other constitutional provisions regarding the filling of legisla-
tive vacancies, which provide for the filling of offices and not just the
granting of powers and duties. Second, and perhaps more convincing,
these statutes are adopted under the legislature's continuity of govern-
ment powers as provided in the state constitution, which textually en-
able state legislatures to adopt laws providing for legislative
succession. In at least one state, Alabama, the state constitution itself
textually provides for the designation of interim legislative succes-
sors.231 As noted by the Council of State Governments, "The [state
226. Id. at 38.
227. Aaron Gould Sheinin, Successor Law Catches Lawmakers Off Guard, COLUMBIA STATE
(S.C.), Jan. 23, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 22946208 (summarizing the views of Univer-
sity of South Carolina School of Law Professor Eldon Wedlock and South Carolina State Senate
President Pro Tempore Glenn McConnell).
228. See, e.g., DEL. CoNsT. art. II, § 6 ("Whenever there shall be a vacancy in either [legisla-
tive house], by reason of failure to elect, ineligibility, death, resignation or otherwise, a writ of
election shall be issued.., and the person thereupon chosen to fill such vacancy shall hold office
for the residue of the term.").
229. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 93, at 36.
230. Id. at 36-37.
231. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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constitution continuity of government provision] insure[s] the validity
of such legislation." 232
In what seems to be the only judicial comment examining the con-
stitutionality of an interim legislative succession statute, the Delaware
Supreme Court advised the legislature that interim succession is a
constitutional exercise of the Delaware General Assembly's powers
granted under the state constitution's continuity of government provi-
sion.233 The court reasoned that the constitution's call for writ of elec-
tions to fill vacancies "does not provide for the immediate filling of
such a vacancy by operation of law," and that it does not therefore
conflict with other constitutional provisions which require official ac-
tion in order for succession to take place.2 34
e. Modern Use and Disuse
Despite eleven states providing for interim legislative succession by
statute,2 35 these unique provisions do not appear to be the subject of
academic scholarship or-for that matter-a subject of discussion
even among legislators in states where these provisions still carry the
force of law. The problem with interim legislative succession provi-
sions is that current legislators are either: (1) unaware of the provi-
sions; or (2) aware of provisions providing for interim legislative
successors, but fail to name legislative successors.
For example, one South Carolina newspaper reported in 2005
that-despite the South Carolina Emergency Interim Legislative Suc-
cession Act being law since 1962 and requiring legislators to generate
lists of interim successors-"[n]ot a single lawmaker could be found
who has actually created such a list. '236 Then-Speaker of the South
Carolina House of Representatives David Wilkins believed the law to
have been repealed (it was not).237 Other legislators, including the
South Carolina Senate President Pro Tempore and Senate Minority
232. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 93, at 37.
233. See Opinion of the Justices, 190 A.2d 521, 522 (Del. 1963).
234. Id. at 523.
235. See supra note 201 (collecting statutory citations of interim legislative succession acts
closely following the model provision).
236. See Sheinin, supra note 227.
237. Id. ("'It's still on the books? How do you know if it's on the books? It might have been
repealed?"' (quoting then-House Speaker David Wilkins)). When asked if he had submitted his
list of interim successors, Wilkins joked, "Yeah, I've done that .... I've got it in my safe deposit
box. I've got seven names because I think it will take at least that many people to do what I do."
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Leader, had never heard of the provision.2 38 The effectiveness of in-
terim legislative succession laws rely on incumbent legislators to desig-
nate successors. To the extent that legislators, like those in South
Carolina, are unaware of these laws or unwilling to name designates in
conformance with the law, temporary succession laws are ineffective.
In at least one state, however, legislators appear to be aware of the
interim succession law and regularly name and update lists of succes-
sors. As of May 2008, approximately eighty percent of the members
of Delaware's 144th House of Representatives had named the statu-
tory minimum of three successors and "many" members opted to
name the maximum seven successors.239 Even today, members are
made aware of the law by a written request from the Delaware Chief
Clerk of the House at the beginning of each General Assembly asking
each to designate successors.240 Members, in practice, typically up-
date designations when a designee has died or moved from the repre-
sentative districtZ41
The Delaware House of Representatives' application and use of
that state's 1961 interim succession law shows that the twenty-first-
century American legislature is capable of implementing an interim
succession law. Under Delaware's Emergency Interim Legislative
Succession Act, a Delaware resident is eligible to be named as an in-
terim successor if she meets the legal requirements for membership in
the state legislature. 242 In practice, approximately half of the mem-
bers of the 144th House of Representatives designated a spouse or a
son or daughter to be a successor. 243 Others chose to designate "civic
association president[s] or other leader[s] in their district. '244 And,
interestingly, one member even designated the person who ran against
him in the previous election.245
238. Id. ("'You showed me something I'd never seen and never knew about."' (quoting Sen-
ate President Pro Tempore Glenn McConnell)); id. ("'I thought I knew everything in [the statute
book] .... But I guess I don't."' (quoting Senate Minority Leader John Land)).
239. Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, Chief Clerk of the Del. House of Representatives, to
author (May 9, 2008, 09:44:39 EST) (on file with author); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 1704
(2008) ("Each member shall designate not fewer than 3 nor more than 7 emergency interim
successors to the member's powers and duties and specify their order of succession.").
240. See Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, supra note 239.
241. See id.
242. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 1705 (2008) ("No person shall be designated or serve as an
emergency interim successor unless the person may under the Constitution and statutes hold the
office of the member to whose powers and duties the person is designated to succeed."). There
is no stated requirement that the designee be of the same political party.
243. See Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, supra note 239.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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Interim legislative successors do not receive credentials, but they do
receive a letter from the House member who designated them.246 Al-
though individual members may vary the language, the model form
letter notifies the designee that she was selected as a designate
"[b]ased on my great respect and confidence in your ability to serve
the State of Delaware as an Emergency Interim Successor" and
thanks the designee for "your acceptance of this commission. '247 The
letter is presented with a copy of Delaware's Emergency Interim Leg-
islative Succession Act along with a certificate bearing the designee's
name and designating member's signature, 248 complete with "gold no-
tary seal" and "blue and gold ribbon. ' 249 Designees do not take an
oath of office, 250 despite a statutory requirement that they be sworn in
at the time of their designation. 251
C. No Statutory Scheme
Twenty-nine states appear not to have enacted suspension of quo-
rum statutes or emergency legislative succession laws.252 While it ap-
pears that most of these states have adopted legislation allowing the
governor to declare a temporary location for the seat of govern-
ment,25 3 providing for a clear line of succession to the offices of gover-
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Letter from Gregory A. Hastings, Del. State Representative, to Mrs. Charlotte
Hastings (June 26, 2007) (on file with author). The letter notes: "Remote as the necessity of
calling you to action may seem, preparedness to continue our sacred democratic institutions of
government.., under any circumstances conceivable is a moral as well as legal imperative." Id.
248. See, e.g., Certificate Designating Charlotte Hastings as Emergency Interim Successor for
Rep. Gregory A. Hastings (June 26, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Certificate Designat-
ing Charlotte Hastings]; Letter from Gregory A. Hastings, supra note 247.
249. Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, Chief Clerk of the Del. House of Representatives, to
author (May 9, 2008, 09:51:37 EST) (on file with author). The certificate is presented "[i]n ap-
preciation of [the designee's] assumption of the responsibilities of serving as an Emergency In-
terim Successor." See, e.g., Certificate Designating Charlotte Hastings, supra note 248.
250. Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, supra note 239 (noting that interim successors do not
take an oath and would only take an oath "upon being pressed into service as a successor").
251. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 1708 (2003) ("Promptly after designation each emergency
interim successor shall take the oath required for the member to whose powers and duties the
successor is designated to succeed." (emphasis added)).
252. Those states include: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For example, the State of Ore-
gon has "[n]o specific [continuity of government] provisions other than those concerning
succession to vacant offices." KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: OREGON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY Au-
THORITIES SUMMARIZED 5 (2004).
253. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.007 (2008); FLA. STAT. § 22.15 (2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
195/1 (2006). In the case of Hawaii and Maine, any two members of the legislature can convene
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nor and lieutenant government, 254 providing for interim succession of
the executive and judicial branches, 255 and permitting the governor to
acquire materials, facilities, and property for civil defense,256 these
twenty-nine states have not adopted any provisions to prepare for leg-
islative continuity. Despite the fact that the state constitutional con-
tinuity of government provisions were intended by their drafters as
"enabling measure[s]" and were not designed to be self-executing,
these state legislators have taken no action.257
This failure to act could be crippling: The political apparatus of
these states could be paralyzed in the event of a mass incapacitation
or an event or disaster which prevents the state legislature from physi-
cally meeting. In Maryland, for example, if the governor and lieuten-
ant governor are incapacitated at the same time, and the legislature is
unable to meet its constitutional quorum requirements-a majority of
all members in joint session-the legislature will not be able to meet
and will not be able to select a new governor to lead the state during
the time of crisis.258
This is troubling, particularly because legislators in states with con-
stitutional continuity of government provisions have an affirmative
duty to adopt enabling legislation. The text of most continuity of gov-
ernment provisions (i.e., those that follow the federal model) place an
affirmative duty on state legislatures to prepare for the succession of
constitutional offices, including the legislative branch, and to provide
for temporary succession: Legislatures have "the power and the imme-
diate duty (1) to provide for prompt temporary succession.., and (2)
to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and proper .... 259
State constitutions do not impose many duties, and the imposition
of a duty in these provisions can be regarded as significant. New
a meeting, and that meeting can occur outside the territorial borders of the state. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 130-3 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 761 (1989).
254. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.040 (2008); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2006).
255. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 22.05 (2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 275/1-11 (2006); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39D.040 (West 1998) (providing for succession in the executive branch only); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 31.10 (2004) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1101 to -1116 (2007); 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 779.1-.12 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 181-192 (2001).
256. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 128-22 (2006).
257. OFFICE OF CIVIL & DEF. MOBILIZATION, supra note 61, at 7; see also supra text accompa-
nying note 178.
258. See MD. CONST. art. II, § 6 ("If vacancies in the offices of Governor and Lieutenant
Governor exist at the same time, the General Assembly shall convene forthwith, and the office
of Governor shall be filled for the remainder of the term by the affirmative vote of a majority of
all members of the General Assembly in joint session."). A recent report commissioned by a
state agency noted this problem and suggested a possible amendment to the Maryland State
Constitution. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
259. See supra text accompanying note 96 (quoting the model provision).
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Hampshire's constitution includes language imposing an "immediate
duty" on legislators to enact continuity of government legislation.260
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized, in another con-
text, that the continuity of government provision's affirmative duty
represents one of only two duties imposed on the legislature in the
state constitution-the other being the duty on the legislature to pro-
vide a public education. 261 Though not judicially enforceable, as the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has noted, the "aspirational
language [of state constitutions] relies on the presumptive good faith
of elected representatives" and imposes on individual legislators a
"lawful obligation[ ]" to satisfy the aspirational requirement. 262 State
legislators should consider continuity of government mandates in their
state constitutions, which they have sworn to uphold in their oaths of
office, in this light.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Every State Should Adopt a State Constitutional Continuity of
Government Provision Reflecting Modern Threats
1. States with Existing State Constitutional Provisions
The phrase "enemy attack," as it is used in the continuity of govern-
ment provisions in eighteen state constitutions, 263 is outmoded and
should be replaced with more universal language addressed to modern
threats. Whether an "enemy" has "attacked" United States soil is no
longer as clear as it may have been in the 1950s and 1960s "bunker"
period, when continuity provisions were first drafted and widely
adopted. In addition, meteorological, geological, and technological
disasters, which may cripple a legislature's ability to meet and justify
the invocation of emergency powers, may not be readily traceable
back to an "enemy" source.264
260. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art. 5-A.
261. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358 (N.H. 1997) (citing N.H.
CONST. pt. II, art. 83 ("[Ilt shall be the duty of the legislators ... to cherish ... public schools
....1 ).
262. Doyle v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 858 N.E.2d 1090, 1094, 1096 (Mass. 2006). An
aspirational statement, such as in the case of the continuity of government provisions, is "ad-
dressed to the legislature rather than to the courts or to the general population." See Lee Har-
grave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; How Did They Fare?, 58
LA. L. REV. 389, 392 (1998). But while such a provision provides "no sanction in case of the
legislature's failure to act," id., it does impose a "lawful obligation[ ]" on legislators. Doyle, 858
N.E.2d at 1096.
263. See supra note 152 (collecting state constitutional provisions using the phrase "enemy
attack").
264. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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In today's world, as Professor Philip Bobbitt has ominously warned,
attacks against nations can be "effectively disguised" given the "very
small numbers of persons, operating with the enormous power of
modern computers, biogenetics, air transport, and even small nuclear
weapons. ' 265 Absent a claim of responsibility by an "enemy" of the
United States, how can a state government determine that it is appro-
priate to invoke continuity of government powers? How are we to
know with certainty that a pandemic flu or disease was the work of
national enemies and not the product of God or natural biological
evolution? Requiring that there be an "enemy attack" to invoke con-
tinuity powers may lead state governments down an unsatisfying or
impossible path-attempting to trace disasters and disease to poten-
tially unidentifiable sources.
A better approach is to amend existing constitutional provisions to
follow the so-called "all-hazards approach" embraced by Louisiana,
Montana, New York, and Utah.266 Under this approach, continuity of
government powers could be invoked because of any emergency-
natural or otherwise. Enabling statutes can define "emergency" in a
limited way, to ensure that these powers are not abused. At least one
state-South Dakota-has worked to amend its continuity of govern-
ment provision (albeit unsuccessfully) in recent years to follow this
approach.267 Other states should follow South Dakota's lead.
2. States Without Existing Provisions
The fifteen states that do not a have constitutional continuity of
government provision must consider amending their state constitu-
tions to add such a provision. Legislatures are needed in times of
emergency to maintain the fundamental systems of checks and bal-
265. PHILIP BOBBITr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HIS-
TORY 811 (2002).
266. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
267. The South Dakota Constitutional Revision Commission considered recommending a se-
ries of changes to "eliminate archaic and confusing constitutional language dealing with the Leg-
islature" in 2005. Joe Kafka, Group Resumes Review of State Constitution: Findings to Be
Reported to 2006, 2007 Legislatures, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), Sept. 12, 2005, at A7, availa-
ble at 2005 WLNR 14324933. Among the changes recommended was a proposal on the 2006
general election ballot to allow the legislature to provide for the temporary succession of elected
and appointed officials in an emergency caused by natural or man-made disaster, modeled after
the Utah continuity of government provision. Email from David Ortbahn, S.D. Legislative Re-
search Council, to author (Mar. 5, 2008, 17:21:43 EST) (on file with author). This change was
combined in one ballot question, with other changes, in "a hodgepodge of constitutional revi-
sions" which "trie[d] to address too much." Editorial, Amendment E, Amendment F, Measure
3-No, ABERDEEN Am. NEWS (S.D.), Oct. 24, 2006, at A4, available at 2006 WLNR 18419458.
The measure was ultimately defeated. See Amendment F Rejected, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS
(S.D.), Nov. 8, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 19385758.
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ances and to provide legislative solutions for disaster response and
recovery, and leaders are needed in the legislature to act with clear
and undisputed authority.268
An argument could be made that continuity of government provi-
sions in state constitutions are superfluous. In a time of emergency or
war, the constitution of a state-and its mechanical process require-
ments, such as quorum requirements-can and should be automati-
cally suspended whether or not there is a continuity of government
provision anticipating the need for such a suspension. This view traces
its origins, in theory, to Cicero's defense of Milo-"Inter arma silent
leges."269 The Supreme Court has noted that the Federal Constitution
is "not a suicide pact, ' 270 and neither should a state constitution be a
pact with the Reaper. The argument continues that if procedural rules
governing legislative quorum and succession hold a state government
captive and unable to accomplish necessary business during a period
of emergency, such rules should be set aside-whether or not explic-
itly authorized by the text of the state constitution. The very survival
of the state apparatus depends on a functioning government. Hence,
the continued functioning of the government should trump any techni-
cal rules within a state's constitution. But such an argument is short
sighted. Continuity of government provisions in state constitutions
''remove any doubt as to the legitimacy of any action taken by the
legislature during an emergency. ' '271 When disaster strikes or the na-
tion is attacked, the rules of procedure and the lines of succession
should be clear. The legitimacy of the state's officials should be undis-
puted. Advanced planning serves to avoid unnecessary confusion,
controversy, and litigation in moments of great peril.
Another argument against adding such a provision is that it might
add further clutter to the state constitution. 272 State constitutions,
under this view, are "generally concerned with broad issues of govern-
mental process and individual rights" and "hyperlegislation" has no
268. See supra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
269. "Amid the arms of war the laws are silent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1725 (8th ed.
2004).
270. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963) (noting that while the
Federal Constitution "protects against invasions of individual rights," "in time[s] of war and
national emergency," latitude should be given to ensure that functions of government are
fulfilled).
271. DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REF-
ERENCE GUIDE 96 (1994).
272. See Representative John Conyers, Jr., Desecrating the Constitution, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 1, 8-9 n.32 (1997) ("'We should resist the temptation to clutter up [the constitution]
with amendments relating to substantive matters."' (quoting Lon Fuller, American Legal Philos-
ophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 465 (1954))).
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place in the constitution.273 But incorporating clear lines of succession
in the blueprints of state government should not be regarded as clut-
ter. These provisions are needed because the continuation of govern-
ment during periods of crisis may require that the legislature act in a
way that conflicts with technical provisions of a state constitution.
Moreover, these provisions do not "legislate" so much as they enable
the legislature to adopt (and continually revise) a state's continuity of
government plans-as continuity of government provisions, by their
very design, are not meant to be self-executing.
B. States with Constitutional Provisions Should Adopt New or
Update Existing Statutory Enactments
1. Update Statutes to Conform with Updated Constitutional
Provisions
Just as states must replace language in their state constitutions
which limit the operation of constitutional continuity of government
provisions to instances of "enemy attack," 274 so too must states amend
existing statutory enactments to replace this outmoded language.
Continuity of government statutes in at least eleven states are only
triggered upon an "attack" by an "enemy of the United States. '275
This language should be broadened to allow for the triggering of these
statutes in circumstances of widespread disaster, even where the ori-
gins of the disaster are unclear or caused by natural events.
2. Adopt Enabling Legislation in States with No Existing Statutory
Enactments
Sixteen states have ratified continuity of government provisions in
their state constitutions but do not appear to have adopted the neces-
sary implementing legislation to provide for legislative continuity.2 76
273. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The
Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RurGERS L.J. 863, 915-16 (1996). Thompson has
noted that state constitutions "do not make for easy reading":
The Illinois Constitution, at approximately 13,200 words, is one of the smallest; the
New York Constitution has over 80,000 words. By contrast, the United States Constitu-
tion has fewer than 10,000. By adding legislative provisions in with more fundamental
principles and processes, a state risks diluting the importance of the more fundamental
provisions. As state constitutions grow more like statutory codes, fewer citizens are
aware of what provisions are found in the constitution. Nor do they care. Little useful
debate and understanding therefore grows out of the provisions.
Id.
274. See supra notes 263-267 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
276. Those sixteen states include: (1) Connecticut; (2) Florida; (3) Maine; (4) Massachusetts;
(5) Minnesota; (6) Missouri; (7) Nebraska; (8) Nevada; (9) New Hampshire; (10) New Jersey;
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A constitutional continuity of government provision, standing alone,
is ineffectual because these provisions are not self-executing. The
drafters of these provisions intended them to enable the adoption of
continuity laws and not to serve as a means of continuity planning by
themselves. 277
Ultimately, these states should take some action. First, legislatures
in states with continuity of government provisions have an affirmative
duty to enact legislation to provide for succession. 278 Second, tradi-
tional vacancy repopulation methods may not be available during
times of crisis. For example, states should not rely solely on elections
to repopulate a legislature following an attack or disaster. Recent
scholarship has focused on the infeasibility of holding statewide elec-
tions in the wake of a disaster because of citizen displacement and
inadequacies in state election capabilities. 279 Thus, it might be impos-
sible to hold elections in the weeks or months following a statewide
disaster.
3. Annually Update Interim Successor Designation Lists and
Amend Existing Laws
Legislators in states that have interim legislative succession acts
should be reminded on an annual basis to update their list of succes-
sors with their state's secretary of state. So long as these provisions
are in the law books, legislators should be aware of them and should
meet their statutory obligations to designate interim successors. Un-
like a quorum suspension provision, these provisions are only effec-
tive if legislators continually update their designations. It will, of
course, be too late after a mass vacancy occurs for a legislator to up-
date her designations.
In states where interim legislative succession acts are followed and
lists are regularly updated, legislators should consider updating ex-
isting legislative succession acts. First, as already discussed, triggering
event language should be updated to reflect modern threats.280 Sec-
ond, cumbersome procedural requirements should be deleted or
(11) Ohio; (12) Pennsylvania; (13) Rhode Island; (14) South Dakota; (15) Utah; and (16)
Wisconsin.
277. See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 252-262 and accompanying text.
279. See generally Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127
(2006) (arguing that holding statewide elections to repopulate government is not feasible).
280. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text (urging legislatures to replace antiquated
triggering language in state statutes, e.g., the phrase "enemy attack"); see also supra notes
263-267 and accompanying text (urging the same update of language to constitutional
provisions).
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changed so that statutory compliance can be ensured. Delaware, for
example, does not administer an oath of office to designees despite an
express statutory requirement that an oath be administered upon des-
ignation.2 81 The law should be clarified to remove this cumbersome
requirement.28 2 Third, immediate family members of legislators
should be statutorily disqualified from being named as interim legisla-
tive successors. Half of the members of the 144th Delaware House of
Representatives, for example, named spouses and sons or daughters
to serve as interim successors. 283 The NCSL has noted that "[n]early
half the states prohibit a legislator from hiring a relative either
through statute or by constitution. '2 8 4 Prohibitions on hiring a rela-
tive should be extended to designating a relative as an emergency suc-
cessor.285 Anti-nepotism restrictions on legislators date back to the
turn of the twentieth century,286 and they exist to prevent favoritism
and conflicts of interest by legislators in hiring and guide legislators to
make hiring decisions based on merit instead of blood relationship.2 87
If a disaster requires interim legislative successors to be pressed into
service, it is critical that the newly constituted legislature have the
most-qualified individuals to serve as legislative replacements and that
those replacements, to the extent possible, appear to the general pub-
lic to be legitimately appointed and competent to act. Restricting fa-
281. See supra notes 250-251 and accompanying text; see also supra note 211 and accompany-
ing text (noting that the model state provision contains this requirement).
282. If the forty-one members of the Delaware House of Representatives each designated the
maximum number of seven successors, 281 interim successors would need to be sworn in upon
designation. Delaware's legislature should consider changing the timing of the oath requirement
to require an oath only in the unlikely (and unfortunate) event that a designee is pressed into
emergency service.
283. See Email from JoAnn M. Hedrick, supra note 239.
284. See NCSL, Ethics in Government: Nepotism Restrictions for State Legislators, http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/ethics/e-nepotism.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2009) (compiling legislative
anti-nepotism laws for all fifty states).
285. It is unclear how existing anti-nepotism laws apply to interim legislative successors. To
the extent that there is doubt as to how anti-nepotism laws apply to the designation of interim
successors, the law should be clarified to make such a prohibition express.
286. See L.E. Aylesworth, Nepotism, 2 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 577, 577 (1908) (noting the enact-
ment of "apparently unique" anti-nepotism laws in Oklahoma and Texas in 1908 and 1907, re-
spectively, that apply to legislators); see also Richard D. White Jr., Consanguinity by Degrees:
Inconsistent Efforts to Restrict Nepotism in State Government, 32 ST. & Loc. Gov'T REV. 108,
109 (2000) ("[N]epotism has been a way of life in American government for centuries.").
287. Anti-nepotism restrictions serve other "good government" purposes as well. See White,
supra note 286, at 109 ("Modern antinepotism laws are the product of Progressive era 'good
government' reforms such as recall, initiative, referendum, and direct primaries and are intended
to eliminate governmental corruption and to increase efficiency. In a way, antinepotism laws are
a method to eliminate another variation of 'spoils' patronage: allotting governmental jobs based
on kinship rather than political cronyism.").
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milial designations may serve to further this purpose and promote the
legitimacy of a reconstituted government.
4. Use Technology in Legislative Continuity Planning
In the event of a statewide crisis or emergency, it is unlikely that
legislators would be able to assemble together at the legally desig-
nated seat of government. States with continuity of government pro-
visions should use their necessary and proper powers to adopt statutes
allowing their legislature to meet by phone, over the Internet, or by
other electronic means in times of emergency, natural disaster, or en-
emy attack in circumstances where the legislative body is prevented
from physically assembling. Such legislation would be authorized by
continuity of government constitutional provisions that allow legisla-
tures "to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and proper
for insuring the continuity of governmental operations. ''288
In today's electronic age, voting sessions of the legislature could be
held remotely by electronic mail, instant messaging, bulletin boards,
telephone conferences, video conferences, web-based conferences, or
facsimile. Statutes authorizing legislative meetings by remote commu-
nications should provide for procedural rules specifically designed for
use with modern communications technology. If meetings via remote
communication forms are authorized, such meetings should be gov-
erned by a detailed procedural framework and parliamentary rules be-
cause existing rules of order and procedure may be inapplicable. 289
Under current law, state constitutions and statutory provisions spec-
ify the place of meetings of legislative bodies, and when the place of
the meeting has been set by law, no valid business can be held outside
of that legally designated place.2 90 Although a number of state consti-
tutions allow for the site of legislative sessions to be moved in times of
288. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the model
provision's necessary and proper clause). Connecticut and Louisiana would be unable to adopt
this recommendation because their continuity of government provision does not include a "nec-
essary and proper clause." See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
289. See ROBERT ET AL., supra note 184, at 2 ("Efforts to conduct the deliberative process by
postal or electronic mail or facsimile (fax) transmission-which are not recommended-must be
expressly authorized by the bylaws and should be supported by special rules of order and stand-
ing rules as appropriate, since so many situations unprecedented in parliamentary law may arise
and since many procedures common to parliamentary law are not applicable." (citations omit-
ted)). But see John D. Stackpole, Rules for Electronic (e-mail) Meetings or The E-liberative As-
sembly, 42 PARLIAMENTARY J. (2001), reprinted in AM. INST. OF PARLIAMENTARIANS,
ELECTRONIC MEETINGS 10, 10 (2002), available at www.aipparl.org/pdflAlPemeet5.pdf (arguing
that "electronic" meetings can be governed by existing parliamentary rules).
290. Cf. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 184, § 705, para. 1.
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emergency or "contagious disease, '291 such provisions-standing
alone-are inadequate measures against new global threats. These
provisions appear only to provide for the physical movement of the
seat of government. The physical assembly of state legislators in one
central location-even in a location other than the usual seat of gov-
ernment-may be an impossibility by virtue of pandemic disease, a
threatened or impending terrorist attack, or even a natural disaster
which disrupts a state's transportation infrastructure.
Admittedly, meetings over email or phone may seem antithetical to
the democratic openness of the deliberative process, and legislators
can use technology to "hide deliberation from the view of the pub-
lic."' 292 In a case of emergency, however, remotely held meetings may
be the only feasible vehicle to convene a statewide legislative body. In
addition, advancements in modern technology may still allow the leg-
islature to comply with open meeting laws and for the public to par-
ticipate in the session. For example, the legislature can use technology
that allows the public to call in to a meeting or listen to a radio or over
the Internet simulcast.
5. Federal Government Should Lead States in Continuity Planning
The federal government should act aggressively, as it did half a cen-
tury ago, to encourage the amendment of state constitutions and the
enactment of state legislation to provide for legislative continuity of
government. In the 1950s and 1960s, federal authorities drafted
model constitutional provisions293 and directly lobbied states to adopt
legislation providing for emergency succession of legislators. 294 The
result was the widespread adoption of constitutional and statutory
provisions at spectacular speeds.295 Today, the Federal Civil Defense
Administration of the 1960s has been replaced by the highly devel-
291. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 19 (providing for the relocation of government by guber-
natorial proclamation where the seat of government has become "dangerous from an enemy or
contagious disease"); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the governor, "in time of invasion or
grave emergency," to "transfer the seat of government to another place"); Ky. CONST. § 36(3)
(allowing the legislature to temporarily relocate "elsewhere" by proclamation of the governor
"in case of war, insurrection or pestilence"); see also supra note 253 (citing statutes that allow for
convening of legislative sessions outside of the designated seat of government).
292. Stephen Schaeffer, Comment, Sunshine in Cyberspace? Electronic Deliberation and the
Reach of Open Meeting Laws, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 755, 755 (2004).
293. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government's influ-
ence in drafting constitutional provisions).
294. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting that federal authorities went so far as
to send telegrams to the governors of twenty-six states urging adoption of continuity provisions).
295. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (noting that thirty-five states adopted con-
stitutional provisions in just seven years).
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oped U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which is well-equipped
to press states to adopt new legislation related to continuity of state
government.
The federal government's responsibility to push for change and con-
tinuity planning should be shared with organizations that represent,
serve, and lobby state governments. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
Council of State Governments, the American Bar Association, and
other groups took a lead role to push for legislative changes. 296 To-
day, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of
State Governments, the National Governors Association, and similar
bodies should encourage states to reexamine their legislative con-
tinuity of government provisions. In particular, the Council of State
Governments should work with the federal government to formulate
and propose to the states new legislation to update the legislative en-
actments they originally reviewed and endorsed in 1958.297 The Na-
tional State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law School,
which has devoted considerable study to "the role of State Attorneys
General in preparing for and reacting to disasters," 298 would be
uniquely qualified to provide further study on continuity of govern-
ment provisions and their enforcement during times of crisis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 thrust forward issues of
homeland security and renewed the relevance of one particular de-
cades-old question: How can our government institutions and democ-
racy survive an enemy attack? The concerns must be broader than
this.
In May 2003, a panel of constitutional scholars and former
lawmakers-including Professors Philip Bobbitt and Charles Fried,
former U.S. Senator Alan Simpson, and former U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral Nicholas deB. Katzenbach-known formally as the "Continuity
of Government Commission," noted that the United States Congress
is the federal institution "least able to reconstitute itself after a cata-
296. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text (collecting a list of civic and advocacy
groups that pressed states to adopt continuity of government amendments).
297. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that the Council of State Governments
reviewed the model continuity of government provision before states adopted it and gave the
provision the Council's "full endorsement").
298. Columbia Law School, Nat'l State Attorneys Gen. Program, Disaster Planning, http://
www.law.columbia.edu/center-program/ag/disasterplan (last visited May 7, 2009); see also Co-
lumbia Law School, Nat'l State Attorneys Gen. Program, About US, http://
www.law.columbia.edu/center-program/as/AGs-About (last visited May 7, 2009).
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strophic attack. ' 299 In its final recommendations, the Commission
called for an amendment to the Federal Constitution that would give
Congress the power to provide legislatively for the appointment of
temporary replacements to fill vacant House seats after a catastrophic
attack and to fill temporarily House and Senate seats held by incapaci-
tated members.300 The Commission favored "an amendment of a gen-
eral nature that allows Congress to address the details through
implementing legislation. ' 30 1 The Commission also advocated, not
surprisingly, implementing legislation that would create a system
where, in the event of a mass lawmaker casualties, temporary appoint-
ments could be made from a list drawn up in advance by an incumbent
member of Congress. 30 2
Though the recommendations were not enacted, they should stimu-
late a continuing discussion. For the most part, the Commission's rec-
ommendations mirror the existing policy choices and wisdom of the
majority of American states.303 Thirty-five state constitutions already
have ratified amendments allowing their legislature to adopt measures
aimed at repopulating itself when a mass vacancy has occurred.30 4 At
least eleven of those states have used these amendments as a spring-
board to enact meaningful legislation providing for "interim legisla-
tive successors" to stand in the shoes of elected legislators who are
incapacitated or otherwise unable to serve when an attack has
occurred. 305
299. CONTINUITY OF GOVT COMM'N, THE CONGRESS: PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS, THE
FIRST REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ii, v-vi (2003), available at
www.continuityofgovernment.org/report/FirstReport.pdf. The recommendations from the re-
port received wide national coverage and commentary. See, e.g., Editorial, Planning for the
Worst, BOSTON HERALD, June 8, 2003, at 24, available at 2003 WLNR 642716; Editorial, The 28th
Amendment?, Prrr. TRIB. REV., June 8, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 13969675; Editorial, Pre-
paring for the Unthinkable, DENVER POST, June 6, 2003, at B6, available at 2003 WLNR 845462.
300. CONTINUITY OF GOVT COMM'N, supra note 299, at 58.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 28-29.
303. Similarities between existing state constitutional provisions and statutory enactments and
the Commission's recommendations are not coincidental. Though the text of the Commission's
report appears not to discuss in detail state constitutional or statutory enactments, it does in-
clude an appendix, which includes a sample of three state continuity of government constitu-
tional provisions. See id. app. VII at 52-56. In addition, Norman J. Ornstein, the Continuity of
Government Commission's senior counselor, revealed in 2007 that he had sought feedback on
Delaware's interim legislative succession act from "many members of Congress." Council on
Foreign Relations, Transcript of Following a Catastrophe-Ensuring the Continuity of Govern-
ment (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/14742/following-a-catastrophe-ensuring-the
_continuity-of-government rush-transcript federal newsservice.html.
304. See supra notes 109-149 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
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The continuity of government provisions in most state constitutions,
and the legislative enactments that flow from these provisions, are far
from perfect and must be updated. The use of antiquated language in
the constitutional provisions threatens to limit the potential invoca-
tion of emergency powers in an unnecessarily narrow way. Addition-
ally, legislative enactments-specifically, interim legislative succession
statutes-may be ineffective because of years of inattention and dis-
use. Legislatures across the nation should revisit legislative continuity
plans, update existing provisions and enactments, and develop new
and creative ways-perhaps involving the use of technology-to deal
with the problem of how to continue the work of government in the
moments following crisis, when a functioning government is most
needed.
Continuity of Government Commission co-chairs Lloyd Cutler and
Alan Simpson, in their introduction to the report bearing their Com-
mission's recommendations, remind us that "[i]t is surely not pleasant
to contemplate the possibility of future catastrophic attacks on our
governmental institutions, but the continuity of our government re-
quires us to face this dire danger directly. '' 30 6 It is, indeed, a hard pill
to swallow that the great chambers that house America's state legisla-
tures can fall victim to a terrorist bombing, pandemic disease, or natu-
ral disaster. Nevertheless, assuring continued representation and
legislative operations for American states during times of crisis should
remain an important policy objective in the post-9/11 world. The cha-
otic aftermath of a disaster is no time to begin such discussions. They
must begin now.
306. CONTINUITY OF Gov'T COMM'N, supra note 299, at ii.
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